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GOING “CLEAR”
Ryan D. Doerfler*
This Article proposes a new framework for evaluating doctrines that assign
significance to whether a statutory text is “clear.” As previous scholarship has
failed to recognize, such doctrines come in two distinct types. The first, which
this Article call evidence-management doctrines, instruct a court to “start with
the text,” and to proceed to other sources of statutory meaning only if absolutely
necessary. Because they structure a court’s search for what a statute means, the
question with each of these doctrines is whether adhering to it aids or impairs
that search—the character of the evaluation is, in other words, mostly
epistemic. The second type, which this Article call uncertainty-management
doctrines, instead tell a court to decide a statutory case on some ground other
than statutory meaning if, after considering all the available sources, what the
statute means remains opaque. The idea underlying these doctrines is that if
statutory meaning is uncertain, erring in some direction constitutes “playing it
safe.” With each such doctrine, the question is thus whether erring in the
identified direction really is “safer” than the alternative(s)—put differently,
evaluation of these doctrines is fundamentally practical.
This Article goes on to address increasingly popular categorical objections to
“clarity” doctrines. As this Article explains, the objection that nobody knows
how clear a text has to be to count as “clear” rests partly on a misunderstanding
of how “clarity” determinations work—such determinations are sensitive to
context, including legal context, in ways critics of these doctrines fail to account
for. In addition, the objection that “clarity” doctrines are vulnerable to
willfulness or motivated reasoning is fair but, as this Article shows, applies with
equal force to any plausible alternative.

Walter V. Schaefer Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago,
The Law School; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
Thanks to William Baude, Mitchell Berman, Richard Fallon, Jonah Gelbach, Roderick
Hills, Aziz Huq, Howell Jackson, John Manning, Jeffrey Pojanowski, David Pozen,
Frederick Schauer, and Matthew Stephenson for helpful comments and suggestions.
*
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INTRODUCTION
Everyone agrees that courts must adhere to “clear” or “plain”
But what to do when a statute is “ambiguous” or its meaning is
otherwise uncertain?2
Numerous legal doctrines condition the
permissibility of some judicial action in a statutory case upon the statute
at issue being less than “clear” or “plain.” Courts may, for example,
consider legislative history,3 defer to an administering agency,4 or avoid
answering a constitutional question5 if a statutory text has more than
one plausible meaning, but not otherwise. Taken together, these various
doctrines make textual “clarity” (or, alternatively, “plainness”) the
central organizing principle for much of the law of statutory
interpretation.6 And, indeed, the same has been true (albeit to varying
degrees7) going back to Chief Justice Marshall, who remarked that
where “words in the body of the statute” are “plain,” there is “nothing …
text.1

As a matter of positive law, that is. E.g., Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016) (“[P]olicy arguments cannot supersede the clear
statutory text.”); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (“As in any
case of statutory construction, our analysis begins with the language of the statute.
And where the statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat)
76, 95–96 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.) (“The intention of the legislature is to be collected
from the words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no
room for construction.”).
2 Ralf Poscher, Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 128, 128 (Lawrence Solan & Peter Tiersma eds.
2012) (observing that “[i]n a colloquial sense, both vagueness and ambiguity are
employed generically to indicate indeterminacy,” but that “[i]n a more technical sense
… ambiguity and vagueness are far more specific phenomena”).
3 N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 942 (2017); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510
U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) (“[W]e do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory
text that is clear.”).
4 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
5 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (When the validity of an act of the Congress
is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”).
6 See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1079, 1082 (2017) (“Interpretation isn’t just a matter of language; it’s also governed by
law.”).
7 See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543–544
(1940) (“When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is
available, there certainly can be no rule of law which forbids its use, however clear the
words may appear on superficial examination.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
1
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left to construction,” but that where “ambiguit[y]” remains, “the mind …
seizes every thing from which aid can be derived.”8
As a doctrinal “linchpin,”9 a great deal often turns on whether a
statutory text is “clear” (or “plain”) or not.10 Perhaps for that reason,
however, scholars and jurists have started to question whether it makes
sense, either in principle or as a matter of practice, to assign so much
importance to that determination. Some critics have asked, for example,
why courts should “seize” that “from which aid can be derived” only if
the text is “ambiguous.”11 Or, as Justice Stevens put it, “[W]hy …
confine ourselves to … the statutory text if other tools of statutory
construction provide better evidence”?12 Others even more skeptical
have queried whether we even know what it means to say that a
statutory text is “clear.”13 Hence Judge Easterbrook, with characteristic
bluntness: “There is no metric for clarity.”14
This Article attempts to clarify15 the discussion surrounding
these various “clarity” doctrines. As it explains, such doctrines can
actually be sorted into two distinct types, with largely distinct concerns
associated with each. The first type, which operate as evidencemanagement doctrines, structure a court’s inquiry into what a statute
means.16 More specifically, these doctrines tell courts to “start with the
text,”17 and to consider additional sources of statutory meaning only if

United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 386 (1805).
Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F Guzior, & Anup Malani, Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An
Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 257 (2010)
(“Determinations of ambiguity are the linchpin of statutory interpretation.”).
10 Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts and Statutes, 79 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 859, 861 (2004) (“Part of the problem is that the law has only two ways to
characterize the clarity of a legal text: It is either plain or it is ambiguous. The
determination is important.”).
11 See William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI.
L. REV. 539 (2017); Adam M. Samaha, If the Text is Clear: Lexical Ordering in Statutory
Interpretation 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2018).
12 Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 106 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
13 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118
(2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
14 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 62 (1988) (emphasis added).
15 (Ha ha.)
16 See infra Part I.A.
17 Adam M. Samaha, Starting with the Text—On Sequencing Effects in Statutory
Interpretation and Beyond, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 439, 440 (2016).
8
9
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absolutely necessary.18 Because they organize a court’s investigation
into statutory meaning, the concerns associated with this type of
doctrine are largely epistemic. For reasons this Article explains, this
sort of lexical ordering of evidence hinders an investigation except in
unusual circumstances.19 With any evidence-management doctrine,
then, the question is whether it applies only in those specific situations.
The second type of “clarity” doctrine, which operate by contrast as
uncertainty-management doctrines, instruct a court how to decide a
statutory case when, despite its best efforts, it isn’t sure what the statute
at issue means.20 In other words, the function of the second type of
doctrine is not to help determine the meaning of a statute, but rather to
provide guidance for how to proceed once it becomes apparent that the
meaning of a statute is not. The basic premise underlying uncertaintymanagement doctrines is that, under conditions of uncertainty,
sometimes erring in a particular direction constitutes “playing it safe.”21
The concerns associated with these doctrines are, in light of that
premise, mostly practical. In each instance, the question is whether a
court’s erring in the identified direction is actually “safer” than acting
on its “best guess” or, alternatively, erring in some other direction.
Using this basic distinction, this Article develops a novel and
administrable framework for assessing individual “clarity” doctrines.
Within that framework, one asks first whether a given doctrine manages
evidence or, instead, manages uncertainty. If the doctrine manages
evidence, one then goes on to determine whether the type of evidence it
manages has some or all of the special characteristics that make lexical
Here and throughout, this Article uses the phrase “statutory meaning” to refer to
the communicative content expressed by statutory text as used—roughly, Congress’s
apparent communicative intention (or, alternatively, the conventional meaning of the
language as used in the relevant context). See Mitchell N. Berman, The Tragedy of
Justice Scalia, 115 MICH. L. REV. 783, 796-99 (2017) (distinguishing communicative
intention from other forms of intention); see also Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Meaning
of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1235, 1246-48 (2015) (calling this a statute’s “contextual” meaning). This
Article takes no position on how best to conceive of Congress’s communicative intention
(e.g., actual or “objectified”) or how best to identify it (e.g., whether to consider
legislative history).
19 See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
20 See infra Part I.B.
21 Here and throughout this Article uses the term “uncertainty” in a colloquial sense,
encompassing both “risk” and “uncertainty” in the technical, decision-theoretic senses
of those terms. See DANIEL M HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 30-31 (1996) (contrasting situations of “risk,” in
which the probabilities of the various possible outcomes are known, and situations of
“uncertainty,” in which those probabilities are unknown).
18
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ordering of evidence epistemically sensible. If, alternatively, the
doctrine manages uncertainty, one instead evaluates the risk analysis
that underlies it: is one type of mistake really costlier than the other, as
the doctrine presupposes, and, if so, to what degree?
In addition to facilitating this sort of individual doctrinal
assessment, the distinction between evidence management and
uncertainty management provides a principled basis for answering
longstanding questions concerning the relationship between different
“clarity” doctrines, in particular the order in which such doctrines
should be applied.22 As this Article explains, because uncertaintymanagement doctrines help manage uncertainty that remains after the
search for statutory meaning, it will almost always make sense for
courts to apply any relevant evidence-management doctrine (e.g., the
conditional admissibility of legislative history or Skidmore) before
determining whether a statute is or is not “clear” for purposes of some
uncertainty-management doctrine (e.g., the rule of lenity or Chevron).23
This Article goes on to address increasingly popular categorical
objections to “clarity” doctrines.24 According to numerous jurists and
scholars, all “clarity” doctrines are worrisome insofar as there is no
consensus among judges as to how clear a statutory text has to be to

See Abbe R. Gluck, Justice Scalia’s Unfinished Business in Statutory Interpretation:
Where Textualism’s Formalism Gave Up, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2053, 2063 (2017)
(“It remains unanswered whether a policy canon is still relevant if legislative history
alone would clarify statutory language.”); James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the
Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (2010)
(worrying that the “lack of an intelligible framework for ordering the canons renders
them distinctly more susceptible to judicial manipulation than other interpretive
resources”).
23 See infra Parts III.C & D.
24 See infra Part II.
22
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count as “clear.”25 Is 65-35 enough, or does “clarity” require 90-10?26
Beyond that, many fear that because it is easy for judges to exaggerate
or understate—whether consciously or unconsciously—how clear a text
is, such doctrines facilitate results-oriented decision making and thus
undermine public confidence in an impartial judiciary.27 If “clarity”
judgments are mere reflections of partisan attitudes, these critics
suggest, adherence to “clarity” doctrines undermines the rule of law.
As this Article explains, the lack of a universal “clarity” standard
should be both unsurprising and unconcerning.28 To say that a statutory
text is “clear” is, in effect, to say that it is clear enough for present
purposes. And since purposes vary from case to case—and, in particular,
from doctrine to doctrine—so too, one should expect, does the degree of
clarity required.29 Relatedly, if judges disagree about how clear a text

See Meredith A. Holland, The Ambiguous Ambiguity Inquiry: Seeking to Clarify
Judicial Determinations of Clarity Versus Ambiguity in Statutory Interpretation, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371, 1372 (2018) (“[T]here is no established method governing
the judge’s threshold determination of ambiguity versus clarity. In fact, there is no
consistent definition of ambiguity.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in
Statutory Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 90 (2017) (“[T]he Justices do not agree
on what ‘ambiguity’ means for purposes of the rule [of lenity].”); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski,
Without Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1075, 1082 (2016) (noting “lurking questions about
how hard courts ought to work before deciding whether a statute is clear”); Kavanaugh,
supra note 13, at 1238 (“The simple and troubling truth is that no definitive guide
exists for determining whether statutory language is clear or ambiguous.”); Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511, 520 (“Here, of course, is the chink in Chevron’s armor—the ambiguity that
prevents it from being an absolutely clear guide to future judicial decisions (though
still a better one than what it supplanted). How clear is clear?”).
26 Kavanaugh, supra note 13, at 1237.
27 Id. at 1237-38; Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and
Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1304 (2002) (“On other
occasions, however, the Justices may reveal substantive policy preferences not in
formulating rules, but in applying them.”); Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 62 (“[C]ourts
may choose when to declare the language of the statute ‘ambiguous.’”); see also Solan,
supra note 10, at 859 (“The problem, perhaps ironically, is that the concept of
ambiguity is itself perniciously ambiguous. People do not always use the term in the
same way, and the differences often appear to go unnoticed.”); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional
Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 598 (1992) (suggesting that variation in the degree
of clarity required reflect “the Court's view of what is an important constitutional
value,” as well as “the relative importance of different constitutional values”).
28 See infra Part II.A.
29 As with “intention,” this Article takes no position on how best to conceive of or
identify a legal doctrine’s underlying “purpose(s).” See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian
Vermeule, The Morality of Administrative Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1944-47
(2018) (discussing Chevron in light of administrative law’s “internal morality”).
25
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must be in some specific case, that is, at least very often, just a legal
dispute about the purposes of the applicable doctrine.
On results-oriented decision making, this Article argues that
what critics have identified is, for the most part, the familiar and
entirely general worry that, in close cases, judges can mischaracterize
the law without serious reputational harm.30 While true that a judge
can with a straight face (and, perhaps, a clean conscience) insist that a
very likely reading of a statute is “clearly” correct (or vice versa), it is
equally easy for a judge to declare “more likely than not” a reading that
is somewhat unlikely. As such, by increasing the probability threshold
a reading must satisfy for a court to enforce it from the typical “more
likely than not” to the more demanding “clear,” “clarity” doctrines do
nothing to increase opportunity for judicial willfulness or motivated
reasoning. What they do instead is merely shift the site of plausible
argumentation.
This Article has three Parts. Part I distinguishes between two
types of “clarity” doctrines, evidence-management and uncertaintymanagement, identifying concerns specific to each. Part II considers
common objections to “clarity” doctrines generally, explaining why those
objections are either misguided or generic. Part III shows this Article’s
proposed framework in action, assessing various familiar “clarity”
doctrines, with some passing the assessment and some not.

I. “CLARITY” DOCTRINES
It is a platitude that courts may not deviate from “clear” statutory
text. What exactly this platitude entails is a matter of some confusion.
As this Part explains, a host of doctrines within statutory interpretation
are fashioned as complements to the consensus position that “when the
intent of Congress is clear from the statutory text, that is the end of the
matter.”31 Each of these doctrines permits a court to attend to
something other than statutory text, but only if the text in question
leaves the intent of Congress unknown.32

See infra Part II.B.
Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 105 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
32 Again, however congressional “intent” is best conceived. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
30
31
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Despite their apparent similarity, these various “clarity”
doctrines come in two importantly different varieties—varieties that
reflect a basic ambiguity in courts’ insistence upon the importance of
“clear” statutory text.
As this Part explains, the first variety of “clarity” doctrine let
courts consider various sources of statutory meaning only if considering
the statutory text in isolation leaves a statute’s meaning uncertain.
Such evidence-management doctrines are peculiar, epistemically
speaking. Ordinarily, sources of evidence are either helpful to consider
or not. Harder to see is why the helpfulness of considering one source
(e.g., legislative history) might turn upon the probative value of some
other (e.g., statutory text). As this Part goes on to show, there are
unusual circumstances in which this sort of conditional admissibility of
evidence does make sense—for instance, if evidence is probative but, for
reasons of psychological bias, one is disposed to overweight it. Less
clear, though, is whether familiar evidence-management doctrines like
the plain meaning rule are appropriately limited to those unusual
circumstances.
As this Part continues, the second variety of “clarity” doctrine
instruct courts to decide statutory cases on grounds other than statutory
meaning if, after considering all available sources, what a statute means
remains unclear. These uncertainty-management doctrines are, in
contrast
to
evidence-management
doctrines,
epistemically
straightforward. A familiar approach to reasoning under conditions of
uncertainty is to err in some direction on the rationale of “playing it
safe.” An assumption underlying this approach, of course, is that one
type of mistake is much worse to make than the other, either
individually or in the aggregate. When it comes to familiar uncertaintymanagement doctrines like the canon of constitutional avoidance, the
question is thus whether the cost assignments underlying those
doctrines are accurate. Is it really much worse, for example, to misread
a statute and declare it unconstitutional than it is to misread and then
enforce it?

A. Evidence-Management
Sometimes when a court says that statutory text is “clear,” what
it means is that the meaning of a statute can be discerned by attending
9
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to its text exclusively. In Milner v. Navy,33 for example, the question
was whether a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption for
material “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency” included data and maps pertaining to the storage of
explosives at a naval base.34 The Court held that no. As Justice Kagan
explained, the exemption’s limitation to “personnel” matters plainly
excluded maps and data unrelated to “employee relations [or] human
resources.”35 Responding to the suggestion that a House Report
concerning FOIA supported the opposite conclusion, she remarked that
while legislative history may help “illuminate ambiguous text,” it may
not be appealed to for the purpose of “muddy[ing] clear statutory
language.”36 In calling the language of the exemption “clear,” Justice
Kagan was thus indicating that there was no need to consider
extratextual evidence—in this case, legislative history—to figure out
what that exemption means.
One way to understand the platitude that courts must adhere to
“clear” statutory text is, then, as an instruction to courts to prioritize
textual evidence of statutory meaning over other, extratextual evidence.
So understood, this platitude expresses what is sometimes referred to
as the “plain meaning” rule.37 The plain meaning rule is, in reality, a
cluster of specific rules, each of which relates to some extratextual
source of statutory meaning—legislative history,38 institutional
practice,39 statutory titles,40 etc. Each specific rule permits a court to
consider the source at issue, but only if the available textual evidence
leaves statutory meaning uncertain. In this way, the plain meaning rule
imposes lexical ordering on a court’s investigation into statutory
562 U.S. 562 (2011).
Id. at 564-65 (2011) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)).
35 Id. at 569, 581.
36 Id. at 572; see also id. at 574 (“Legislative history, for those who take it into account,
is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”).
37 Baude & Doerfler, supra note 11, at 541 (“The plain meaning rule says that
otherwise-relevant information about statutory meaning is forbidden when the
statutory text is plain or unambiguous.”).
38 United States v. Woods, 571 U.S. 31, 46 n.5 (2013) (“Whether or not legislative
history is ever relevant, it need not be consulted when, as here, the statutory text is
unambiguous.”).
39 Milner, 562 U.S. at 575-76 (reasoning that “clear statutory language” makes
irrelevant “30 years” of contrary practice by lower courts); United States v. Ron Pair
Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 245–46 (1989) (reasoning that “pre-Code practice” is
relevant only if statutory text is less than “clear”).
40 Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–529 (1947) (recognizing
“the wise rule that the title of a statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the
plain meaning of the text”).
33
34
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meaning: Start with the statutory text and proceed to other sources only
if absolutely necessary.41
This “start with the text” approach to statutory interpretation
might seem like a sensible intermediate position between strict
textualism and some form of all-things-considered eclecticism or
pragmatism.
Upon reflection, though, the lexical ordering of
interpretive sources gives rise to a puzzle.42 Ordinarily, information is
either helpful to an investigation or not. For that reason, policies of
categorical inclusion or exclusion of specific types of information are
easy to understand and, unsurprisingly, familiar features of our legal
landscape. To illustrate, in the eyes of Congress, cost is a relevant
consideration when assessing whether to regulate emissions from
stationary sources like power plants or factories. The Environmental
Protection Agency is thus required to at least consider cost when
deciding whether regulate such sources, even when the noneconomic
concerns are overwhelming.43 By contrast, cost is, in Congress’s view,
irrelevant when evaluating threshold nuclear safety measures. Hence,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission may not consider cost when
determining what is “adequate protection to the health and safety of the
public.”44
More difficult to understand are policies of conditional inclusion
or exclusion of certain information. For example, if legislative history is
evidence of statutory meaning, why not consider it in all statutory cases?
Even if textual evidence points strongly in one direction, what is the
harm in at least looking at that extratextual source? Alternatively, if
legislative history is irrelevant or misleading for purposes of
interpretation, why consider it ever? Even if textual evidence is largely
unhelpful in some case, considering an irrelevant or misleading source
can only make things worse.
As it turns out, there are at least a couple of potential answers to
the rhetorical questions above.45 If certain information is especially
See Samaha, supra note 11, at *7-8 (explaining lexical ordering); see also Adam M.
Samaha, On Law’s Tiebreakers, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1661 (2010) (exploring the use of
lexically inferior decision rules as legal “tiebreakers”).
42 This puzzle is articulated more fully in Baude & Doerfler, supra note 11, at 546-49.
43 See Michigan v EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707-08 (2015).
44 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a); Union of Concerned Scientists v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm’n, 824 F.2d 108, 114 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that “[t]he Commission must
determine, regardless of costs, the precautionary measures necessary to provide
adequate protection to the public”).
45 See Baude & Doerfler, supra note 11, at 549-65 (surveying possible answers).
41
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costly to consider, for example, it would make sense, assuming limited
resources, to start by considering cheaper information.46 If one can rule
out a restaurant based on the menu, there is no reason to try it in
person.47 Somewhat differently, if information is probative but, for
reasons of psychological bias, one is disposed to overweight it, one might
be justified in turning to that information only if non-biasing
information leaves one uncertain.48 Job talks by aspiring academics, for
instance, may do more harm than good if the paper record is clear. Such
talks may at the same time prove helpful if, after considering written
materials, the faculty finds itself on the fence.
These sorts of special considerations may or may not support the
assorted evidence-management doctrines that make up the plain
meaning rule. Legislative history is conceivably too expensive to
consider as a matter of course. But statutory titles? Hardly so. Beyond
that, lexically ordering sources of statutory meaning introduces
opportunity for willfulness or motivate reasoning that may swamp any
would-be efficiency gains. This objection is considered more fully
below.49 Very briefly, though, it is not hard to see how a willful or
motivated judge might exaggerate how clear textual evidence makes
things, thereby excluding from consideration other, less convenient
evidence. Importantly, the costs of exaggeration and understatement of
textual clarity are asymmetrical with such “plain meaning” doctrines
insofar as understatement results only in marginal underweighting of
textual evidence, whereas overstatement results in the total exclusion
of non-textual evidence.

B. Uncertainty-Management
Other times, in calling statutory language “clear,” what a court
means is that statutory meaning is apparent based upon whichever
source(s). Within the Chevron framework, courts defer to the policy
judgment of an administering agency unless “Congress has spoken
clearly” on the issue.50 To see whether Congress has made itself
Id. at 549-51.
A vegan, for example, deciding against a steakhouse.
48 Id. at 552-54.
49 See infra Part II.B.
50 City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 308 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
46
47
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sufficiently clear, courts employ the “traditional tools of statutory
construction,” which include most obviously attention to statutory text,
but also consideration of, for example, linguistic canons,51 practical
consequences,52 and, for those who consider it at all, legislative history.53
Hence, as Justice Scalia explained, “[a] statutory provision that may
seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified” as additional information
gets folded in.54
The other way to hear the platitude that courts must adhere to
“clear” text is, accordingly, as forbidding courts from substituting, say,
more desirable policy for identifiable statutory meaning. Interpreted
this way, the platitude is a complement to numerous legal doctrines that
purport not to aid in the search for statutory meaning, but instead to
help courts decide cases when statutory meaning remains opaque.
Again, Chevron is the most straightforward example. Within that
framework, courts defer to an administering agency only if a statute is
“silent” or “ambiguous” on the question at issue.55 Even more explicitly,
courts say that filling such a statutory “gap” requires a “policy choice”
on the part of the administering agency.56 Taken together, such
remarks suggest that Chevron deference has nothing to do with
identifying statutory meaning.57 Rather, it is only if statutory meaning
cannot be identified—again, after employing all the traditional tools—
that deferring to an administering agency is called for.
Unlike the evidence-management doctrines discussed above,
doctrines like Chevron are, in terms of structure, epistemically
straightforward. Because an administering agency is not an authority
on what a statute means, it makes sense for a court not to defer to that

See National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 522
U.S. 479, 500, 502 (1998).
52 See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014) (rejecting an
agency reading based partly on the “calamitous consequences of interpreting the Act
in that way”).
53 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (“If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation
of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we
should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that
the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.” (emphasis added)
(quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382, 383 (1961))).
54 Util. Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2442.
55 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
56 Id. at 866.
57 In this respect, the Chevron framework differs interestingly from the earlier
approach to agency deference articulated in Skidmore v. Swift. See infra Part III.C.
51
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agency when investigating statutory meaning.58
But sometimes
investigations into statutory meaning come up empty, or at least leave
courts less than certain. What to do then? One approach is for a court
to give its “best guess,” enforcing the reading of the statute it thinks is
most likely correct. That is what courts do in run-of-the-mill statutory
cases—and, really, all that they can do when there is no other legal basis
for deciding the case.59
Another approach, though, is for a court to err in a certain
direction, enforcing a reading that is, for some reason, safer even if it is
less likely correct than some other. The idea of “playing it safe” is
familiar from everyday life.60 Suppose, for example, that leaving for the
airport at 8:30 AM would only “probably” allow one to make one’s flight.
Barring unusual circumstances, one would opt in that situation to leave
a bit earlier, reasoning that it is better to wait around at the gate than
to be left there. The same reasoning might easily apply in a statutory
case. If reading A is only “probably” correct, and erroneously enforcing
reading B (also plausible, let’s assume) would be much less costly than
erroneously enforcing reading A, enforcing reading B might constitute
the safer course of action even though reading A is more likely correct.
As with any other type of decision, the reason(s) might vary
significantly why erroneously enforcing one reading of a statute would
be less costly than erroneously enforcing some other.
Most
straightforwardly, misinterpreting a statute one way might yield
immediate consequences that are much worse than those that would
result from the opposite type of mistake.61 Alternatively, one type of
mistake might be less costly to correct.62 Moving beyond individual
At least, not a legal authority. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 27 (1983) (“To be sure, the court must interpret the statute; it must decide what has
been committed to the agency.”). An administering agency may, nonetheless, be an
epistemic authority on the issue. See infra notes 279-291 and accompanying text.
59 Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
984, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2701 (2005) (contrasting cases in which a court decides a case
based upon the “best reading” of a statute with those in which a court a court
determines there is only one “permissible reading”).
60 See Ryan D. Doerfler, High-Stakes Interpretation, 116 MICH. L. REV. 523, 549-51
(2018).
61 In addition, the types of consequences at issue might vary, ranging from concrete
harms to individuals (e.g., erroneously imposed fines or imprisonment) to abstract
harms to institutions (e.g., a loss of legitimacy).
62 Here, an everyday analogy would be something like deciding whether to send an
email/text late at night. Come morning, one type of mistake is ordinarily much easier
to correct than the other.
58
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decisions, erring in a particular direction might be less costly on average
or in the aggregate, in which case courts would reduce costs by erring
that way in the relevant class of cases.63
Numerous legal doctrines instruct courts to err in some direction
when deciding a certain type of statutory case absent “clear” statutory
meaning. The premise of these doctrines seems to be that erring in the
specified direction amounts to “playing it safe” in those cases. Again,
within the Chevron framework, courts defer to an administering
agency’s policy judgment unless the statute at issue is “clear.” This
means that in some situations, a court will defer to an agency even
though it thinks that some other reading is more likely to be correct as
a matter of interpretation.64 Implicit in that rule of decision, then, is
that it is safer to err in the direction of an agency’s policy judgment if
statutory meaning is uncertain. Better to leave in place an agency policy
(or agency policies65) Congress has precluded, in other words, then to
displace one that it has not.
One may or may not agree with Chevron’s underlying substantive
assessment.66 With any uncertainty-management doctrine, there is
always the question whether the doctrine manages uncertainty wisely.
To use another example, the canon of constitutional avoidance seems to
presuppose that misreading and then enforcing a statute is much better
than misreading and then declining to enforce it.67 If one rejects that
presupposition—and some do—one probably thinks that the canon of
constitutional avoidance ought to go.68 Whatever one thinks of any of
these doctrines in terms of substance, however, the point here is just
that uncertainty-management doctrines are, in contrast to evidencemanagement doctrines, unpuzzling in terms of form. With each such
doctrine, the idea is, again, that erring in some direction constitutes

See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 5 (2006) (arguing that “judges should interpret
legal texts in accordance with rules whose observance produces the best consequences
overall” (emphasis added)).
64 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980 (holding that courts must enforce an agency’s reading
“even if the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory
interpretation”).
65 Again, the benefits of adhering to an uncertainty-management doctrine may accrue
in the aggregate, as opposed to in each individual case. See supra note 63 and
accompanying text.
66 See infra Part III.B.
67 See infra Part III.A.
68 Or at least be adjusted. See id.
63
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“playing it safe.” That approach to reasoning under conditions of
uncertainty is both familiar and straightforward.

*

*

*

As Justice Kagan remarked, federal judges in the United States
are “all textualists now.”69 But what does that mean, exactly? It is part
of our law of statutory interpretation that judges may not deviate from
“clear” statutory text. As this Part has explained, however, this
exaltation of “clear” text is (ironically) ambiguous. Perhaps noncoincidentally, this ambiguity corresponds to a theoretical disagreement
about what makes a method of statutory interpretation “textualist” in
the first place.
Understood one way, textualism is mainly a view about the
legitimate sources of statutory meaning.70 Textualist judges are, on this
picture, ones who attend in statutory cases to “semantic” sources like
statutory language, dictionaries, and linguistic canons, and who ignore
or deemphasize “policy” sources like, most famously, legislative
history.71 Corresponding to this picture of textualism, the various
evidence-management doctrines discussed in Part I.A instruct courts to
prioritize “semantic” sources over “policy” sources through lexical
ordering, barring consideration of “policy” sources if consideration of
“semantic” sources yields a clear answer.
Understood another way, however, textualism has less to do with
legitimate sources of statutory meaning and more to do with legitimate
sources of law.72 On this picture, textualist judges treat what statutory
Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the
Reading of Statutes at 8:09 (Nov. 17, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalialecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation.
70 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1287,
1288 (2010) (“Textualism maintains that judges should seek statutory meaning in the
semantic import of the enacted text and, in so doing, should reject the longstanding
practice of using unenacted legislative history as authoritative evidence of legislative
intent or purpose.”).
71 John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
70, 94–95 (2006) (“In short, textualists give precedence to contextual evidence
concerning likely semantic usage while purposivists do the same with contextual cues
that reflect policy considerations.”).
72 See Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, 110 NW. U. L. REV.. 811, 828 (2016) (“As
textualists have long argued, the best (and perhaps only) way for Congress to identify
specific [legislative] means is for it to use specific words.”); John F. Manning, The New
Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 116 (2011) (“If interpreters treat the statutory
text as simply a proxy for the law’s ulterior purpose, they deny legislators the capacity,
69
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language communicates (or maybe better, seems to communicate73) as a
statute’s presumptive contribution to the law.74 In turn, such judges
refuse to deviate from what Congress “said” to advance some apparent,
more general policy aim.75 Corresponding to this picture, the different
uncertainty-management doctrines considered in Part I.B require
courts to prioritize statutory meaning over other potential sources of
law. These doctrines permit courts turn to supplementary, nonlinguistic sources of law, but only if the primary source of law, statutory
meaning, is uncertain.
These two ways of thinking about textualism are compatible but
logically distinct. One could, for example, accept that what a statute
says is the law, but also that “policy” sources are just as important as
“semantic” ones when figuring out what it is that a statute says.76
Analogously, while one might incline towards both uncertaintymanagement doctrines like Chevron and evidence-management
doctrines like the conditional admissibility of legislative history, one
could easily, depending in part upon one’s theoretical inclinations, go in
for only one.
A follow-on question77 is whether it even makes sense to look at
statutory meaning through an epistemic lens if one believes, pursuant
to the second way of thinking about textualism, that statutory text “is
not evidence of the law,” but instead “is the law.”78 The discussion of
through their choice of words, to distinguish those statutes meant to embody specific
policy choices from those meant to leave policy discretion to the law’s implementers.”);
see also Frederick Schauer, Law’s Boundaries, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2435-36 (2017)
(“Law is a source-based enterprise, and understanding its nature accordingly requires
understanding which sources constitute the law and which do not.”).
73 See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
74 See Hrafn Asgeirsson, Can Legal Practice Adjudicate Between Theories of
Vagueness?, in VAGUENESS AND LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 95,
103-04 (Geert Keil & Ralf Poscher eds., 2016) (arguing that the communicative content
of a statute is coextensive with its legal content absent some “rebutting” or
“undercutting” source of law); Mark Greenberg, The Standard Picture and Its
Discontents, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 39 (Leslie Green & Brian
Leiter eds., 2011) (calling the position according to which a statute’s legal content is
identical to its communicative content the “standard picture,” articulating forceful
objections against that position).
75 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 420 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In holding
otherwise, the Court replaces what Congress said with what it thinks Congress ought
to have said ….”); see also Doerfler, supra note 72 at 823-34.
76 See, e.g., Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J.
979, 995-98 (2017).
77 Thanks to Dick Fallon for pressing me on this point.
78 Easterbrook, supra note 25, at 82.
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uncertainty management in Part I.B., for example, seems to presuppose
that a judge could be unsure what a statute means at the end of her
search for statutory meaning. But how could that be if, as “text-is-thelaw” textualists insist, a statutory text means whatever a reasonably
informed interpreter would think that it means?79 Put differently, if a
statute is less than “clear” on this story, isn’t that just to say that that
statute has no meaning for purposes of the case at issue? Or, put
differently, isn’t it to say that the statute’s meaning is
underdetermined? Setting aside difficult philosophical questions about
the nature of underdeterminacy,80 one response is to observe that taking
an ordinary epistemological approach to truths that are “whatever we
think they are” is familiar from everyday life. When one reads a work
of crime fiction, for instance, one forms various hypotheses about the
identity of the perpetrator, assigning probabilities to each. Sometimes,
however, the novel ends without the identity of the perpetrator being
revealed. In that situation, questions like “Who was the killer?”
plausibly admit of no determinate answer. And yet, awareness of that
possibility (or, for that matter, its realization81) does nothing to prevent
the reader from thinking about such questions in much the same way as
she would if she were reading about some actual crime.
Building on that analogy, one way to understand “text-is-the-law”
textualism is as providing a solution to the familiar problem of
attributing communicative intentions to Congress despite Congress’s
being a “they,” not an “it.”82 The solution this form of textualism
provides is to have judges act as if legislation had a unitary author,
attributing to that legislation whatever communicative intentions one
See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2392–
93 (2003) (“[Modern textualists] ask how a reasonable person, conversant with the
relevant social and linguistic conventions, would read the text in context.”); Antonin
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (explaining that
textualists appeal to “a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person
would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus
juris”).
80 See S.G. Williams, Indeterminacy and the Rule of Law, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
539, 545-54 (2004) (reviewing TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN THE LAW (2000))
(surveying metaphysical and epistemological accounts of indeterminacy).
81 See, e.g., Martha P. Nochimson, Did Tony Die at the End of The Sopranos?, VOX.COM
(Aug 27, 2014), https://www.vox.com/2014/8/27/6006139/did-tony-die-at-the-end-ofthe-sopranos/.
82 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992); see also Doerfler, supra note 76, at
998-1020 (criticizing more recent attempts to analogize Congress to a corporation).
79
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would attribute to its author as such.83 On this approach, reading
statutory text is thus akin to reading a work of fiction, with the fiction
being that Congress is an “it,” not a “they.”84 As with any other work of
fiction, the reader naturally forms hypotheses about the work, assigns
to them different probabilities, etc. And, happily, none of this is
impaired by the fact the “story,” so to speak, is sometimes cut short.85

II. CATEGORICAL OBJECTIONS
As Part I explains, different “clarity” doctrines do very different
things. For that reason, it would be surprising if it were possible to
assess them as a lot.
A growing number of jurists and scholars are attempting
nonetheless to do just that, arguing, roughly, that “clarity” doctrines are
generally suspect because they are so hard to administer.86 More
specifically, these critics complain that such doctrines produce
unpredictable outcomes both because there is no consensus as to what
they require, and because there is no way to establish whether that
requirement (whatever it is) has been met.
This Part addresses each of these complaints in turn. First, it
argues that the expectation of a universal “clarity” standard is
misguided. As philosophers have shown, the degree of epistemic
confidence or justification required to call something “clear” varies from
context to context. More specifically, as the practical stakes of a
situation increase or decrease, so too does the requisite confidence or
justification. Building upon this insight, this Part reasons that one
should expect that how clear a statutory text must be to count as “clear”
will vary from case to case, and, in particular, from doctrine to doctrine.
Because different “clarity” doctrines serve different purposes, what it
takes to satisfy them should be expected to differ as well. Relative to

Doerfler, supra note 76, at 1024.
Id. at 1022-31 (articulating a “fictionalist” account of congressional intent).
85 In part, this is plausibly owed to the fact that one can always devote further cognitive
resources to answering a question. Especially when the pertinent evidence is varied
and complex, it will often seem possible that, with additional consideration, a “clear”
answer might reveal itself. Further reflection might, in other words, render coherent
a body of evidence that previously seemed conflicting or confusing.
86 Kavanaugh, supra note 13; see also, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 14 at 62.
83
84

19

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3326550

some doctrines, calling a text “clear” is, legally speaking, simply not a
big deal. Relative to others, however, it really is.
Second, this Part urges that it is no easier to establish that a text
is or is not “clear” than it is to show that, for example, one reading of a
text is “better” than another. As various critics rightly observe, in some
cases it does seem that what best explains a court’s declaration that a
statute is “clear” (or not) is the court’s policy preference and not the law.
Be that as it may, the same is surely true in some cases in which a court
says that one reading is “better” than another. As this Part suggests,
then, the worry that “clarity” doctrines are vulnerable to willfulness or
motivated reasoning is just an instance of the more general worry that,
in close cases, judges can and do (consciously or unconsciously)
mischaracterize the law without serious reputational harm. “clarity”
doctrines are, in other words, indeed vulnerable to judicial willfulness
or motivated reasoning. That fails to distinguish them, however, from
any other statutory interpretation doctrine.

A. No Consensus What Required
The first and most popular concern with “clarity” doctrines in
general is that there is no consensus on how clear a statutory text must
be to count as “clear” for doctrinal purposes.87 “If the statute is 60-40 in
one direction, is that enough to call it clear? How about 80-20? Who
knows?”88
The basic question “How clear is clear?” is a reasonable one.89 If
judges are supposed to base decisions upon whether a text is “clear,”
they need to know what “clarity” requires. More still, it does seem right
See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 25, at 90; see also Brian G. Slocum, The Importance
of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis, and the Central Role of
Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791, 807–08
(2010) (“There is no consensus regarding th[e Chevron] standard ….”); Note, “How
Clear Is Clear” in Chevron’s Step One?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1687, 1691 (2005)
(“[Applying Chevron,] clarity or ambiguity is the test, and courts have not been
consistent in the level of clarity that they require.” (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted)).
88 Id. at 2137. Justice Scalia also appears to have believed that the threshold for
textual “clarity” was constant across cases. See Scalia, supra note 25, at 520-21
(analogizing Chevron to the plain meaning rule). For a contrasting view, see Note,
supra note 87, at 1688 (arguing that “the question ‘How clear is clear?’ should have a
different answer depending upon the circumstances
89 Scalia, supra note 25, at 520-21.
87
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to suggest that textual clarity has something to do with epistemic
confidence or justification: At a minimum, a statute cannot be “clear” if
the two candidate readings are equally likely. Before assessing whether
60-40 is “enough,” though, it helps to step back and look at how speakers
use epistemic terms like “clear” more generally.
As philosophers have observed, people’s willingness to use certain
epistemic terms varies according to the practical stakes. More
specifically, as the practical stakes of a situation increase or decrease,
speakers become more willing or less willing to deploy terms like “know”
or “clear,” holding constant the level of epistemic confidence or
justification.90 The easiest illustration of this linguistic phenomenon are
pairs of intuitive, everyday examples involving varying practical
circumstances. For instance:
LOW STAKES:

Two students are several spots down the
waitlist for a seminar, and attending the first session is
mandatory. As they approach the seminar room, they see
a line of eager students out the door. Taking this seminar
is not especially important to either. Although the meeting
time is fairly convenient, the topic does not interest either
that much. Looking at the line, one student suggests to the
other, “Let’s go for food instead.” The other student
responds, “Are you sure? The class time is really good for
my schedule.” The first student replies, “Just look at the
line. It’s clear that we’re not going to get in anyway.”
HIGH STAKES:

Two waitlisted students are approaching the
seminar room, as in LOW STAKES, and notice the line out the
door. Again, one student again suggests to the other going
out for food, reasoning that neither will make it off the
waitlist. In this case, however, getting into the seminar is
very important to both. The topic is in an area in which
they would both like to work, and the professor is
incredibly important and influential. The other student
reminds the first of these facts, and then says, “Sometimes
people drop. Is it really clear that we won’t get in?”
Remaining as confident as she was before that neither will

See, e.g., KEITH DEROSE, THE CASE FOR CONTEXTUALISM (2009); Jason Stanley,
KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICAL INTERESTS (2005); Jessica Brown, Contextualism and
Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres, 130 PHIL. STUD. 407 (2006).
90
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make it off the waitlist, still, she replies, “Well, no. We’d
better go in just to be safe.”91
What these examples and others like them suggest is that the
appropriateness of claiming that something is “clear” can be affected by
the practical stakes.92 In LOW STAKES, it seems appropriate for the
speaker to claim that it is “clear” that neither student will make it off
the waitlist based upon apparent enthusiasm. In HIGH STAKES, by
contrast, it seems appropriate for the speaker to refrain from making
such a claim, even though the evidence available to her concerning the
chances of making it off the waitlist is the same. What explains the
difference? Ostensibly, it is just that, in HIGH STAKES, the practical
consequences of mistakenly acting on the premise that neither would get
off the waitlist are much greater.
Technical explanations of the above speech pattern vary.93
Regardless, what these and other examples bring out is a
straightforward connection between epistemic confidence or
justification and practical interests. On any of the prevailing technical
explanations, it is appropriate to say that something is “clear” only if
one has adequate epistemic confidence or justification as to that thing.
And, on any of those explanations, what counts as adequate confidence
or justification depends upon our practical interests. In low-stakes
situations, the truth of the proposition at issue (e.g., that the preferred
candidate will win) matters to the conversational participants only a
little. As such, what speakers and listeners demand in those situations
is just that someone who claims it is “clear” that that proposition obtains
have moderate epistemic confidence or justification concerning that
proposition. By contrast, in high-stakes situations, the truth of the
proposition in question matters a great deal to the parties involved. For
that reason, speakers and listeners demand in those situations that
claims of “clarity” have significantly more epistemic support.
By connecting epistemic confidence or justification and practical
interests, the way we use terms like “clear” suggests an already intuitive
link between epistemic and practical rationality. To be more precise, it
See Doerfler, supra note 60, at 544 (using similar examples). These examples are
modeled on the so-called Bank Case, imagined by Keith DeRose. See Keith DeRose,
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions, 52 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 913,
913 (1992) (demonstrating a similar pattern of usage for “knowledge” and its cognates).
92 This discussion draws freely from Doerfler, supra note 60.
93 Compare DEROSE, supra note 90 (arguing that epistemic terms are context-sensitive
in a narrow, semantic sense) with Brown, supra note 90 (arguing that the pattern is
best explained by appeal to pragmatic factors).
91
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supports the principle that the epistemic confidence or justification
required to act on some premise increases or decreases in accordance
with the practical stakes. To illustrate, consider again the examples
above. In LOW STAKES, not only is it appropriate for the speaker to say
that it is “clear” that neither student will get off the waitlist, but also for
her to act accordingly, walking right past the seminar room. In HIGH
STAKES, by contrast, the increased cost of acting erroneously on the
premise that neither student would get off the waitlist requires that the
speaker be more cautious both about what she says and about what she
does.
Returning to the law, what this suggests is that adhering to a “6535 rule” or a “90-10 rule” across cases probably makes little sense. To
say that a statutory text is “clear” is, as with anything else, to say that
it is clear enough for present purposes.94 And because purposes vary
from case to case, it would be surprising for 65-35, 90-10, or any other
ratio to be exactly enough epistemic confidence or justification each and
every time. Perhaps in a run-of-the-mill statutory case, it would make
sense for a court to be satisfied with 65-35 after looking at just the
statutory text. But in a major case? Seems like there a court really
ought to consider additional sources of statutory meaning, even if doing
so would be especially costly.95
In addition to varying from case to case, stakes can also shift from
doctrine to doctrine. Pursuant to the canon of constitutional avoidance,
courts famously strain to read statutes in ways that let them avoid
answering constitutional questions.96
As Chief Justice Holmes
explained, “declar[ing] an Act of Congress unconstitutional … is the
gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform”
and so one that demands great caution.97 Courts will, for that reason,
adopt an interpretation they deem less likely correct than some other if
doing so will let them avoid calling a statute’s constitutionality into
question so long as that less likely interpretation is at least “fairly
possible,” which is to say so long as the constitutionally concerning
In this respect, “clear” behaves like any other gradable adjective. To say that a
basketball player is “tall,” for example, communicates one thing (e.g., that she is tall
for a basketball player), while saying that a gymnast is “tall” something else (e.g., that
she is tall for a gymnast). See, e.g., STANLEY, supra note 90, at 35-37.
95 Cf. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of
Plain Meaning, 1990 S. CT. REV. 231 (arguing that “plain meaning,” in the sense of
ordinary meaning, operates as a low-cost coordinating mechanism for judges in
“uninteresting” cases).
96 See infra notes 163-165 and accompanying text.
97 Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147–48 (1927) (Holmes, C.J., concurring).
94
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interpretation is not “clearly” correct.98 In practice, “fairly possible”
turns out to be an easy threshold to satisfy, and so “clear” an especially
difficult one—again, courts in this area appear closer to 90-10 than 6535.99 And given the alleged “grav[ity]” of invalidation, this should come
as no surprise.
Contrast this with the rule of lenity, a facially similar “clarity”
doctrine that operates very differently on the ground.100 Just as the
canon of constitutional avoidance tells courts to err in the direction of
constitutionality, the rule of lenity says that “where there is ambiguity
in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant.”101
Despite this similarity, the rule of lenity does almost no work as applied,
requiring only that a court adopt a defendant-friendly interpretation “if,
after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, [that court] can
make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.”102 In
ordinary criminal cases, courts thus appear much closer to 65-35 if not
51-49. As Intisar Raab has argued, one possible explanation for this
asymmetry is that courts have lost sight of some of the original
constitutional justifications for the rule.103 Regardless, that courts
apply this “clear” statement rule so much more casually suggests that,

Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See infra notes 163-165 and accompanying text.
100 See, e.g., United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–22
(1952) (Frankfurter, J.) (“But when choice has to be made between two readings of
what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the
harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is
clear and definite.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485
(1917) (“[B]efore a man can be punished as a criminal under the Federal law his case
must be plainly and unmistakably within the provisions of some statute ….” (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
101 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); see also United States v. Universal
C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–22 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.) (“But when choice
has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it
is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress
should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.” (emphasis added));
Donnelley v. United States, 276 U.S. 505, 511 (1928) (recognizing “the familiar rule
that one may not be punished for crime against the United States unless the facts
shown plainly and unmistakably constitute an offense within the meaning of an act of
Congress” (emphasis added)).
102 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted).
103 See Intisar A. Raab, The Appellate Rule of Lenity, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 201
(2018) (arguing that Roberts Court’s reluctance to apply the rule of lenity is owed in
part to its inattention to the liberty interests that underlie the doctrine).
98
99
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as a matter of doctrine, the stakes of criminal cases are dramatically
lower than those of would-be constitutional ones.104
Whether courts should attend to differences in the practical
stakes of individual cases is a difficult question.105
Far less
controversial, though, is that courts may recognize differences between
classes of cases that are encoded in the positive law. As a strictly legal
matter, how clear a statute has to be to count as “clear” for avoidance
purposes is very different from what “clarity” requires for purposes of
lenity. This and similar differences reflect differences in the legally
attributed stakes—as a doctrinal matter, avoidance cases are a much
bigger deal than ordinary criminal cases. One may or may not agree
with that assessment, just as one may or may not agree with the familiar
doctrinal assessment that criminal cases have higher stakes than civil
cases.106 Either way, such implicit assignments of importance are a
familiar feature of the law. And so long as the importance assigned
varies from doctrine to doctrine, the idea of a universal standard for
what it takes to be “clear” is a non-starter.
Even if a universal standard is not to be had, though, courts still
need to know how clear a statutory text has to be to count as “clear” in
an individual case. Here then-Judge Kavanaugh expresses skepticism,
remarking that “[n]o case or canon of interpretation says that my 65-35
approach or my colleagues’ 90-10 or 55-45 approach is the correct one
(or even a better one).”107 Similarly, Judge Easterbrook remarks, “The
Rule of Lenity does not say how serious .. ambiguity must be” to trigger
the rule.108 But is that right? Remember, as construed, the rule of lenity
applies only if a court “can make no more than a guess” as to what the
statute means. That sounds a lot like 55-45, and not at all like 90-10.
Concededly, in other doctrinal areas, what “clarity” requires is
much more contested. In Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States,109
Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, rejected an IRS interpretation
of a tax statute, reasoning that “in light of all the textual and structural
clues before us, we think it’s clear enough” that the IRS interpretation

But see infra Part III.B (considering an alternative explanation).
On the one hand, it seems psychologically implausible to expect courts not to attend
to such differences. On the other, there does seem to be something unjust about courts
treating some cases as more important than others.
106 See Doerfler, supra note 60, at 550.
107 Kavanaugh, supra note 13, at 2138.
108 Easterbrook, supra note 25, at 90.
109 138 S. Ct. 2067 (2018).
104
105
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is incorrect.110 As discussed above, to say that a text is “clear” is always
to say that it is clear enough for present purposes. Still, the apparent
implication of Justice Gorsuch’s phrasing was that “clear” within the
Chevron framework is a relatively easy threshold to satisfy. That same
day, the Court also issued its opinion in Pereira v. Sessions.111 There
again, the Court rejected an agency interpretation on the grounds that
the statute at issue was “clear,” appealing to text, context, and “common
sense.” 112 In dissent, Justice Alito accused the majority of “simply
ignoring Chevron,” arguing that the majority’s interpretation was
“textually permissible,” but that the choice between that interpretation
and the agency’s was “difficult” and so the agency ought to have
prevailed.113 Observing that “[i]n recent years, several Members of this
Court have questioned Chevron’s foundations,” Justice Alito closed by
insisting that “unless the Court has overruled Chevron in a secret
decision that has somehow escaped my attention, it remains good
law.”114
These and other cases indicate a push by some jurists to
understand “clarity” for Chevron purposes as less demanding than
previously thought.115 Notice, however, that Justice Alito’s comment in
Pereira indicates that this is a squarely doctrinal dispute. According to
Justice Alito, “Chevron’s foundations” establish that overturning an
administering agency’s interpretation is a big deal, and so a statute
must be quite clear for a court to do so. Justice Gorsuch, by contrast,
seems to think that, agency or no, courts have a duty to say what the
law is, and so a statute’s being “clear enough” is enough. Given Justice
Gorsuch’s and others’ noted skepticism toward “the premises that
underlie Chevron,”116 one fears, with Justice Alito, that Justice
Id. at 2074.
138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018).
112 Id. at 2110.
113 Id. at 2121, 2129.
114 Id. at 2129.
115 Instructive here is Judge Raymond Kethledge’s recent remark that “as a judge, I
have never yet had occasion to find a statute ambiguous” under Chevron. Raymond
M. Kethledge, Ambiguities and Agency Cases: Reflections After (Almost) Ten Years on
the Bench, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 315, 320 (2017). Charitably, Judge Kethledge’s
statement indicates not that he has enjoyed 90-10 confidence in every Chevron case
(epistemically implausible), but rather that his threshold for “clarity” is much lower
than that.
116 Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2121 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Given the concerns raised by
some Members of this Court, it seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an
appropriate case, the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have
implemented that decision. The proper rules for interpreting statutes and determining
110
111
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Gorsuch’s gloss on Chevron constitutes a subtle (or not so subtle)
attempt to change the law.117 Either way, there is little reason to think
that courts are incapable of debating openly what Chevron’s premises
require, or, alternatively, whether those premises should be rejected. In
doctrinal areas subject to widespread disagreement, it may also be that
the law is simply underdetermined—for instance, there may be no
correct answer to the question how clear a statutory text has to be to
count as “clear” for Chevron purposes.118
Legal indeterminacy is,
however, a generic problem, which is to say there is little reason to think
that “clarity” doctrines are especially prone to indeterminacy.
Here it also helps to remember that to reject a “clarity” doctrine
like Chevron is to take a position in the corresponding debate rather
than to avoid it. Again, the basic idea of Chevron is that courts “play it
safe” by deferring to an administering agency when statutory meaning
is uncertain, which is to say that the cost of mistakenly reversing an
agency action is greater than the cost of mistakenly affirming it, either
individually or in the aggregate. Maybe that’s right, maybe it isn’t. But
to reject Chevron without having that discussion is just to act as if it
isn’t.119

B. Inevitably Biased Application
The other pervasive objection to “clarity” doctrines in general is,
as Abbe Gluck puts it, that “we have no coherent, cabined, objective, or
predictable definition” of “clarity” (or, conversely, “ambiguity”).120 The
result, as then-Judge Kavanaugh describes it, is that “judgments about
agency jurisdiction and substantive agency powers should accord with constitutional
separation-of-powers principles and the function and province of the Judiciary.”).
117 In response to Wisconsin Central, one scholar remarked, “Perhaps the ‘clear enough’
standard will encourage circuit and district judges to lower their thresholds for finding
clarity closer to the 50-50 range, thus narrowing the scope of Chevron deference at step
one.” Chris Walker, Gorsuch’s “Clear Enough” & Kennedy’s Anti-”Reflexive Deference”:
Two Potential Limits on Chevron Deference, Notice & Comment (June 22, 2018),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/gorsuchs-clear-enough-kennedys-anti-reflexive-deference-twopotential-limits-on-chevron-deference/.
118 See Scalia, supra note 25, at 520-21 (calling Chevron’s “clarity” standard
“ambigu[ous],” predicting that “future battles” will be fought over the degree of clarity
required to satisfy the doctrine).
119 To return to an earlier analogy, to leave for the airport at whatever time seems
more likely than not to be early enough to make the flight is to act as if it is no worse
to miss the flight than to wait around at the gate.
120 Gluck, supra note 22 at 2063.
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clarity versus ambiguity turn on little more than a judge’s instincts,”
making it difficult “for judges to ensure that they are separating their
policy views from what the law requires of them.”121
The problem these critics allege can be broken into two parts. The
first is that determinations whether a statutory text satisfies some
stipulated clarity threshold—say, 65-35—are largely unreasoned. The
second is that those determinations are (therefore) especially vulnerable
to policy-bias.
Start with the first. According to then-Judge Kavanaugh,
whether a statute is “clear” or not “turns out to be an entirely personal
question, one subject to a certain sort of ipse dixit.”122 As illustration,
he cited MCI v. AT&T,123 a case in which the question was whether the
Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) authority to “modify” a
rate-filing requirement for common carriers included the authority to
eliminate that requirement for all non-dominant long-distance
carriers.124 The Court held 5-3 that it did not. Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia began by observing that “[v]irtually every dictionary we
are aware of says that ‘to modify’ means to change moderately or in
minor fashion.”125 From there, Justice Scalia reasoned that eliminating
the rate-filing requirement for such a large swath of long-distance
customers was “much too extensive” to constitute a mere “modification”
as it changed the statute “from a scheme of rate regulation in longdistance common-carrier communications to a scheme of rate regulation
only where effective competition does not exist.”126 In dissent, Justice
Stevens emphasized that the Communications Act “gives the FCC
unusually broad discretion to meet new and unanticipated problems,”
and that, owed to new competition in the long-distance market,
mandatory filing for non-dominant carriers served “no useful purpose
and is actually counterproductive” in the FCC’s view.127 Responding to
the argument that “modify” includes only “minor” changes, Justice
Stevens observed that if the rate-filing section “is viewed as part of a
[larger] statute whose aim is to constrain monopoly power, the
Commission’s decision to exempt nondominant carriers is a rational and
‘measured’ adjustment to novel circumstances—one that remains
Id. at 2138-39.
Id. at 2142.
123 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
124 Id. at 220.
125 Id. at 225.
126 Id. at 231-32.
127 Id. at 235, 239.
121
122
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faithful to the core purpose” of that section.128 For these and other
reasons, Justice Stevens concluded that the FCC’s interpretation was,
at the very least, “permissibl[e]” and so ought to control under
Chevron.129
Whichever side got the better of the exchange in MCI, it can
hardly be described as unreasoned. Both Justice Scalia and Justice
Stevens offer up familiar sorts interpretive arguments, explaining why
one reading is more likely correct than the other—or at least likely
enough (or not) for purposes of Chevron. Such arguments are exactly
what one would expect in any statutory case. Because MCI is a Chevron
case, the burden of persuasion is different— “clear,” as opposed to more
likely than not. The evidence put forward is, however, the same.
Another way of putting the point is that, in terms of reasoned decision
making, all that doctrines like Chevron do is increase the applicable
evidentiary threshold (as explained below, the story is slightly more
complicated for evidence-management doctrines like the plain-meaning
rule).130 Thus, unless one is a skeptic about statutory interpretation in
general, there is little reason to think that decisions made under a
“clarity” standard are anything other than “rational.”131 In terms of
“neutral[ity], impartial[ity], and predictab[ility],”132 it is hard to see why
51-49 would fare any better than, say, 65-35.
Professor Gluck (along with Judge Easterbrook) grounds her
pessimism in a discussion of Lockhart v. United States,133 a case that
involves the rule of lenity.134 This Article assesses Lockhart below.135
For now, it suffices to say that, as in MCI, both the majority and dissent
in that case (there, Justices Sotomayor and Kagan) each offer a wide
range of familiar interpretive arguments—exactly the sorts of

Id. at 241.
Id. at 245.
130 See infra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
131 To their credit, Professor Gluck and Judge Easterbrook tilt in that direction,
decrying what Judge Easterbrook calls an “absence of method” in statutory
interpretation. See Easterbrook, supra note 25, at 83; accord Gluck, supra note 22, at
2058 (expressing concern that “true formalism in statutory interpretation might be
impossible”).
132 Kavanaugh, supra note 13, at 2137.
133 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016).
134 See Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of
Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways That Courts Can Improve on What They
Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 193 (2017); Easterbrook, supra note
25, at 90.
135 See infra notes 214-225 and accompanying text.
128
129
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arguments one would expect to see even if the rule of lenity (or any other
“clarity” doctrine) were irrelevant to the case.
So why, then, does it seem to many that judgments about “clarity”
are “arbitrary,” a reflection of judicial “policy preference” as opposed to
the law? In part, that perception is probably owed to implicit
disagreements between judges in individual cases as to how clear a text
has to be to count as “clear.” As discussed above, whether “clarity” for
Chevron purposes requires 65-35 or 90-10 is a legal question that can
and must be subjected to legal argumentation. Be that as it may, judges
are not always good about debating such issues openly and explicitly. In
Wisconsin Central, for instance, Justice Gorsuch simply presupposes
that “clear enough” is enough for Chevron, rather than explaining why
“clarity” is not especially demanding under that doctrine. Insofar as
such disagreements remain implicit—which is to say unargued—it is
easy to see how one might think that something like differences in policy
preference are what explain them. What this suggests, however, is that
judges need to be open and honest about such doctrinal disagreements,
and not try to introduce indirectly their preferred view of the law.
In other part, though, this widespread perception is presumably
owed to some number of disagreements about “clarity” really being
disagreements about policy.136 Whether consciously or unconsciously,
judges (like the rest of us) occasionally exaggerate or understate the
likelihood of legal claims based upon their views of what would be
good.137 So long as judges care about their reputations, the degree to
which they exaggerate or understate in this way is constrained.138 If a
reading of some statute is clearly correct, a willful or motivated judge
could mischaracterize that reading as merely “likely” without serious
reputational harm.139 To mischaracterize it as “clearly incorrect” would,
See, e.g., Solan, supra note 10, at 865 (“[A]t times courts themselves may not be
sincere when they hold that the language of a statute is clear.”)
137 See generally Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCH. BULLETIN
489 (1990).
138 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Votes of Other Judges, 105 GEO. L.J.
159, 182 (2016) (observing that if “all judges always act solely so as to promote the
interests of their political party,” then normative interpretive theory is pointless);
Solan, supra note 10, at 866 (“Surely our understanding of language does some work
in limiting the range of plausible interpretations of legal texts, and a great deal of work
at that.”).
139 See Doerfler, supra note 72, at 840-41. Importantly, the suggestion here is not that
judges are reputation maximizers. Considerations like the practical significance of a
given case might, for example, affect a judge’s willingness to incur reputational harm,
or, alternatively, her blindness to the reputational harm that might result from
adopting a particular reading. Similarly, the argument here need not assume that the
136
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however, result in significant criticism.140 Assuming that’s right, one
should expect that judges will sometimes exaggerate or understate the
likelihood of different readings in close cases, moving readings above or
below the threshold of “clear” depending on what advances their
partisan interests. Whether an agency action is deemed “clearly”
precluded, for example, may indeed turn on who is in the White
House.141
As the above suggests, though, willfulness or motivated reasoning
pose a problem in close cases generally.142 In an ordinary statutory case,
a judge could, without embarrassing herself, mischaracterize a merely
likely interpretation as “unlikely.” And because it is an ordinary case—
that is, a case in which the evidentiary threshold is more likely than
not—that would be enough to alter the outcome. Here again the
question is why think that judges would have an easier time
exaggerating or understating the likelihood of various readings if the
epistemic threshold were, say, 65-35, as opposed to 51-49? In any
statutory case, there has to be some line past which the moving party
prevails.143 And wherever that line happens to be, the risk of willfulness
or motivated reasoning will be greater the closer a case is to that line.144

only determiner of judicial reputation is apparent conformity of judicial decision
making with what the law is. See Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the
Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 627-31 (2000)
(considering various possible determiners of judicial reputation).
140 At least assuming the relevant audience is not similarly willful or motivated.
141 On the assumption that the Supreme Court cases are closer on average than circuit
court cases, this might help explain the empirical observation that Chevron constrains
the latter more reliably than the former. See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker,
Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 9 (2017) (“Although Chevron may
not have much of an effect on agency outcomes at the Supreme Court (based on prior
empirical studies of the Court), it seems to matter markedly in the circuit courts.”).
142 The following argument assumes that would-be legal disputes are distributed
evenly across the interpretive probability spectrum, both in terms of numerosity and
practical significance. This assumption is based upon the “principle of insufficient
reason.” See VERMEULE, supra note 63, at 173–75 (observing that it is rational under
certain circumstances to assume that unknown probabilities are equal). Ex ante, there
is no reason to believe that there are more, or more consequential, practical disputes
that turn on questions of statutory interpretation near the 51-49 line, as opposed to
the 65-35 line (or any other).
143 Remedies aside, outcomes of legal disputes are binary, not scalar.
144 David Pozen suggests that “clarity” standards might be especially vulnerable to
motivated reasoning because claims of interpretive “necessit[y] … allow advocates to
hide from themselves the ineradicable contingency and ambiguity of legal meaning
and the ineradicable discretion and responsibility that follow.” David E. Pozen,
Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 936 (2016). Even if that’s right, one
would expect its marginal significance to be limited by the textualist turn in statutory
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Worth mentioning here, the degree to which textual “clarity”
judgments are vulnerable to motivated reasoning may depend upon the
way in which “clarity” questions are framed. In an intriguing empirical
study, Ward Farnsworth, Dustin Guzior, and Anup Malani found that
when asked directly whether a statutory text is “ambiguous,”
interpreters’ judgments were strongly biased by their respective policy
preferences..145 By contrast, when interpreters were asked whether
“ordinary readers would agree about the statute’s meaning,” the effect
of the interpreter’s policy preference disappeared.146 Based upon this
finding, Professors Farnsworth, Guzior, and Malani argue that legal
doctrines that assign significance to textual “ambiguity” ought to turn
on what they call “external” judgment, which is to say judgments about
how ordinary readers would understand the text at issue), and not
“internal” judgments, which is to say judgments about how the judge
understands the statute.
In terms of doctrine, courts are neither clear nor consistent about
whether “ambiguity,” or, alternatively, “clarity” determinations are
supposed to be “internal” or “external.” Sometimes, courts hint that
what matters is how an “ordinary” person would understand statutory
language.147 Other times, however, the suggestion is that what courts
care about is how an “ordinary Member of Congress would have read”
the text in question.148 Most of the time, though, courts give no
indication that how some other person would understand a statutory
text is of interest—the question instead is just what did Congress
mean?149 As a constitutional matter, the guarantee of “fair notice”
grounded in the Due Process Clause would seem to recommend the
“ordinary” person frame.150 Add to this the practical advantages
interpretation. The reason is that, following that turn, courts can already disavow
responsibility for it decision in a statutory case (e.g., “Congress made me do it!”)
without having to blame the “clear” text.
145 Farnsworth, Guzior, & Malani, supra note 9, at 259-60.
146 Id.
147 E.g., Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (“Statutory
construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption
that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative
purpose.”).
148 E.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149 See, e.g., F.A.A. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 294 (2012) (“[O]ur task is to determine
what Congress meant by ‘actual.’”); U. S. Dep’t of State v. Washington Post Co., 456
U.S. 595, 599 (1982) (“The language of Exemption 6 sheds little light on what Congress
meant by ‘similar files.’”); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 143 (1914) (“[I]t is
essential to understand what Congress meant in the use of that term ….”).
150 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (“A conviction fails to
comport with due process if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a
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identified by Professors Farnsworth, Guzior, and Malani, and it seems
that courts would do best to resolve any doctrinal inconsistency or
underdeterminacy in that direction. This is especially so if, as most do,
one regards congressional intent as something of a “construct,” in which
case courts cannot avoid defining the appropriate epistemic perspective
from which to evaluate a statutory text.151 But even if not, it seems both
legally plausible and normatively desirable that a statutory text is only
clear enough to count as “clear” if an “ordinary” or “reasonable” person
would regard it as “clear” (attending to the practical stakes, and so on).

*

*

*

As indicated above, addressing concerns about willfulness or
motivated reasoning is comparatively easy when it comes to
uncertainty-management doctrines.
With respect to the search for
statutory meaning, uncertainty-management doctrines have no bearing
on what evidence a court should consider. Instead, all that such
doctrines do is increase the degree of epistemic confidence or
justification needed for a court to enforce some reading. Whether, for
example, a case falls within Chevron’s domain has no bearing on what
evidence of statutory meaning a court should consider, or, in turn, the
“rationality” or vulnerability to policy bias of its interpretive reasoning.
By contrast, with evidence-management doctrines, the story is
slightly more complicated. Under an evidence-management doctrine,
the evidence of statutory meaning a court may consider is potentially
different and somewhat more limited than it would be if that doctrine
did not apply. A court may, for example, judge it appropriate to enforce
a statutory reading under the plain-meaning rule after considering only
the statutory text, to the exclusion of other pertinent, non-textual
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited ….”); BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (“Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in
our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice ... of the
conduct that will subject him to punishment ....”).
151 Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 359, 362 (2005) (observing
that because “Congress is a collective entity,” the “concept of legislative ‘intent’ is
obviously something of a construct for textualists and intentionalists alike,” and that
textualists and intentionalists both limit interpreters to “publicly available” evidence).
On such an approach, a judge would presumably limit herself to reasonably available
information as well as reasonably shared normative and non-normative assumptions.
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Statutory Interpretation Muddle (manuscript)
(discussing the relevance of overlapping linguistic intuitions to theories of
interpretation operating with an “objectified” conception of congressional intent).
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evidence. Such a judgment might fairly be characterized as less
“rational”152 than one arrived at after considering the excluded evidence
in addition. Generally speaking, judgments are more accurate and more
stable the more evidence upon which they are based. And at least
insofar as non-textual evidence is excluded on grounds of, say, cost,153 a
judgment arrived at under the plain-meaning rule is not only less
accurate, but also more vulnerable to willfulness or motivated reasoning
than an ordinary interpretive judgment. The reason is that the
evidentiary basis for that judgment is comparatively thin. That tradeoff
may be worth it. Sometimes “cheap and good enough” is the right
approach. Still, it is important to recognize that with uncertaintymanagement doctrines like Chevron, there really is no tradeoff in terms
of “rationality.” With evidence-management doctrines like the plainmeaning rule there is some tradeoff, at least if the justification is cost.

III. APPLICATIONS
Parts I and II dealt with “clarity” doctrines mostly in the abstract.
This Part is more concrete, discussing in detail four familiar “clarity”
doctrines: the canon of constitutional avoidance, the rule of lenity, the
“plain meaning” rule as it applies to legislative history, and Chevron. As
the discussion illustrates, whether a specific doctrine is best understood
as an evidence-management doctrine or, instead, as an uncertaintymanagement doctrine is sometimes not obvious. Correspondingly,
whether or in what form these doctrines should be preserved can be a
difficult question.
This Part also highlights how sorting different “clarity” doctrines
into different categories can help settle longstanding questions about
the order in which such doctrines should be applied. As it explains,
because uncertainty-management doctrines help courts deal with
uncertainty that remains after the search for statutory meaning, courts
should almost always apply evidence-management doctrines—which
organize that search—before applying the former type of doctrine. As
this Part explains, this simple observation leads to some surprising
results, including, for example, that courts should afford agencies
Skidmore deference before deciding whether a statute is “clear” for

152
153

Though probably not as “irrational.”
As opposed to, say, psychological bias. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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purposes of Chevron, or that courts should consider legislative history
when determining whether Congress has “clearly” abrogated state
sovereign immunity.

A. Constitutional Avoidance
In its “modern” form, the canon of constitutional avoidance
instructs courts to adopt a less natural but “fairly possible”
interpretation of a statute if giving that statute its “most natural”
interpretation would raise “substantial constitutional questions.”154
The stated justifications for the doctrine vary slightly. Sometimes
courts ground the avoidance canon in “due respect” for Congress as a
“coordinate branch of the government.”155 Other times, they emphasize
the practical wisdom of adjudicating constitutional questions only if
necessary.156 The overall sentiment, though, seems best captured by
Chief Justice Holmes’s remark, mentioned above, that declaring an act
of Congress constitutionally invalid is a “grave” and “delicate” duty and
so one that courts should approach with great caution.157
Looking at these various statements, the canon of constitutional
avoidance is characterized most straightforwardly as an uncertaintymanagement doctrine. Again, the motivating idea is that declaring a
statute unconstitutional is a really big deal. And from this, courts
apparently infer that they should address constitutional questions only
if really sure that a statute means what they think that it means. But
does that make sense? Does the “grav[ity] and “delica[cy]” of judicial
review really get one to the avoidance canon in its modern form? At the
outset, it is worth mentioning that taking an especially cautious
approach to statutory interpretation is only one way for courts to “play
it safe” in this space. Alternatively or in addition, courts could take a
similarly cautious approach to constitutional interpretation, declaring
invalid an act of Congress only if really sure that the Constitution means
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994); see also U.S. ex rel
Attorney Gen. v. Delaware & Hudson Co, 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) (conditioning
avoidance on “grave and doubtful constitutional questions”).
155 In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96 (1879).
156 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 463 U.S. 147, 157 (1983) (recognizing “the
Court’s prudential policy of construing acts of Congress so as to avoid the unnecessary
decision of serious constitutional questions” (emphasis added)); N.L.R.B. v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979) (same).
157 Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147–48 (1927) (Holmes, C.J., concurring).
154
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what the court thinks that it means.158 Beyond that, there is the
familiar question of why the avoidance canon should be triggered by
mere
constitutional
“questions,”
as
opposed
to
actual
159
unconstitutionality.
In terms of avoiding unnecessary denunciation
of Congress, the latter would seem to suffice.160
Even retreating to “classic” avoidance, questions about the canon
remain.161 As discussed above, the premise of any uncertaintymanagement doctrine is that the costs of mistake are asymmetric. With
the avoidance canon, the thought seems to be that misinterpreting a
statute and then declaring it invalid is worse than misreading that
statute and then enforcing it. Maybe that’s right. Misreading a statute
and then declaring it invalid does seem like adding insult to injury.162
But even if so, the more difficult question is how much worse is it, really?
In practice, courts bend over backwards to avoid constitutional

Cf. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
159 See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983) (arguing that conditioning avoidance on
constitutional questions “create[s] a judge-made constitutional ‘penumbra’”); see also
Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 74 (“[I]t is by no
means clear that a strained interpretation of a federal statute that avoids a
constitutional question is any less a judicial intrusion than the judicial invalidation on
constitutional grounds of a less strained interpretation of the same statute.”).
160 The switch from “classic” to “modern” avoidance appears to have been motivated by
the concern that “when a court engages in classical avoidance, it provides what
amounts to an advisory opinion on a constitutional issue.” Trevor W. Morrison,
Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1204–05
(2006).
161 Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance As Interpretation and As Remedy, 114 Mich.
L. Rev. 1275, 1279 (2016) (“Under the classic doctrine of avoidance, judges only avoided
interpretations that would actually make the statute unconstitutional.”); see also
Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 148 (Holmes, C.J., concurring) (“[A]s between two possible
interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the
other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act.”).
162 On the other hand, misinterpreting and then enforcing a statute involves giving
force to a policy with no constitutional legitimacy … also not great.
158
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questions, enforcing “strained,”163 “implausible,”164 or even “tortured”165
interpretations of statutes.
Here, the easiest contemporary illustration is Bond v. United
States.166 In that case, a Pennsylvania woman had spread dangerous
chemicals on the “car door, mailbox, and door knob” of her “closest
friend” upon learning of an extramarital affair between the friend and
the woman’s husband.167 Federal prosecutors subsequently charged the
woman with two counts of possessing a “chemical weapon,” in violation
of the federal statute implementing the near-identically worded
international Convention on Chemical Weapons.168 The statute defines
“chemical weapon” in relevant part as “[a] toxic chemical and its
precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under
this chapter as long as the type and quantity is consistent with such a
purpose.”169 “Toxic chemical,” in turn, is defined as “any chemical which
through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.”170 Lastly, the
statute defines “purposes not prohibited by this chapter” as “[a]ny
peaceful purpose related to an industrial, agricultural, research,
medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity,” and other specific
purposes.171 The chemicals used by the woman in the attacks were,
concededly, “toxic to humans and, in high enough doses, potentially
lethal.”172 At the same time, it was “undisputed” that the defendant “did

John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP.
CT. REV. 223, 254 (2000) ([T]he Court itself has often recognized that the avoidance
canon may compel acceptance of a ‘strained’ interpretation ….”).
164 William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 865 (2001) (“[T]he most common and persuasive objection to
the avoidance canon is that it leads to implausible constructions of statutory language
….”).
165 Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme
Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2112 (2015) (“[Aggressive
application of the canon] leads to tortured constructions of statutes that bear little
resemblance to laws actually passed by the elected branches.”).
166 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
167 Id. at 2085.
168 Id. at 2085-86; see also 18 U.S.C. § 229 (a)(1); Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, Apr. 29, 1997, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317; S. Res. 75, 105th Cong. (1997).
169 18 U.S.C. § 229F (1)(A).
170 Id. § 229F (8)(A).
171 Id. § 229F (7)(A).
172 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085.
163
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not intend to kill” the friend, and instead “hoped” that the friend would
“touch the chemicals and develop an uncomfortable rash.”173
Following her conviction, the defendant argued on appeal that
federal criminalization of this sort of domestic assault exceeded
Congress’s enumerated powers and invaded powers reserved to the
states by the Tenth Amendment.174 In so arguing, the defendant seemed
to call into question the century-old precedent Missouri v. Holland,175
which stated that “[i]f the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about
the validity of the statute” that implements it “as a necessary and proper
means to execute the powers of the Government.”176 The Supreme
Court, however, avoided the constitutional issue, holding instead that
the statute did not reach the defendant’s conduct. The statute’s
definitional sections notwithstanding, Chief Justice Roberts explained
that the “ordinary meaning” of the phrase “chemical weapon” calls to
mind “chemical warfare,” not “spreading irritating chemicals on [a]
doorknob.”177 Chief Justice Roberts emphasized moreover that our
“constitutional structure” leaves the prosecution of “purely local crimes”
to the states, and so one should hesitate to attribute to Congress the
intention to “upset the Constitution’s balance between national and
local power” by “defin[ing] as a federal crime conduct readily denounced
as criminal by the States.”178
Whatever one thinks of the Chief Justice’s reasoning, it seems
likely that the Court would have held that the statute applied to the
defendant’s conduct absent the extraordinary circumstances: The
chemicals that possessed and used were “potentially lethal” and so
seemingly “toxic,” and her “purpose” was evidently not “peaceful.”
Q.E.D.179 Indeed, the Chief Justice seemed to concede as much in his
opinion, remarking that an otherwise “clear” statutory text can be made
“ambigu[ous]” by the “deeply serious consequences of adopting” its
otherwise most natural reading.180
The practice of straining to avoid constitutional questions that
one sees in Bond and other, similar cases would plausibly be justifiable
Id.
Id. at 2086.
175 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
176 Id. at 432.
177 Id. at 2090.
178 Id. at 2083, 2090, 2093 (internal quotation marks omitted).
179 Id. at 2094 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“End of statutory analysis, I would have
thought.”).
180 Id. at 2090.
173
174
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if the cost of declaring a statute invalid based on a misreading were
dramatically greater than the alternative.181
If erroneous nonenforcement truly were catastrophic, then requiring something
approaching absolute certainty concerning statutory meaning before
declaring a statute invalid would seem to make both practical and
epistemic sense. And yet, how plausible is that? In terms of
constitutional duties, interpreting statutes faithfully and accurately is
also incredibly important. And from an inter-branch perspective, it is
less than obvious why Congress would prefer systematic
misinterpretation to the occasional erroneous non-enforcement.182 Even
conceding that, from Congress’s perspective, erroneous non-enforcement
is worse than mere misreading,183 to make sense of cases like Bond, one
would, again, have to claim that it is so much worse that it is worth
avoiding at almost any cost in terms of interpretive accuracy.
Qua uncertainty-management doctrine, then, the classic
avoidance canon is conceivably justified, assuming an easy-to-satisfy
threshold for “clarity.”184 Getting to modern avoidance, or to the nowfamiliar, very demanding “clarity” threshold seems, however, much
more doubtful.
Another approach would be to reconceive the canon of
constitutional avoidance as an evidence-management doctrine.
According to Justice Scalia, for example, the avoidance canon rests on
the “reasonable presumption” that “between competing plausible
interpretations of a statutory text,” Congress “did not intend the
alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts.”185 One way of
interpreting Justice Scalia’s characterization is as saying that whether
an interpretation “raises serious constitutional doubts” is simply
evidence of statutory meaning.186 That seems plausible. Members of
See Doerfler, supra note 60, at 552 (explaining that “courts’ assessment of what is
‘fairly possible’ in [modern] cases is plausibly (and reasonably) affected by the
perceived practical stakes”).
182 See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 165, at 2113 (arguing that aggressive application
of the modern avoidance canon “can be even more antidemocratic than outright
invalidation, by putting in place a law that Congress did not want and that, because
of various inertial forces laced into our constitutional system, Congress will not be able
to change”).
183 For instance, because constitutional holdings have broader ramifications for
Congress’s ability to legislate generally.
184 Or maybe better, a “best guess” standard, with a slight thumb on the scale in favor
of actually constitutional readings. See infra notes 226-230 and accompanying text.
185 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005).
186 The alternate interpretation is that Justice Scalia is claiming that Congress prefers
that courts resolve statutory unclarity in ways that avoid serious constitutional
181
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Congress swear an oath to uphold the Constitution.187 It is thus only
charitable to assume that Congress intends readings of statutes that are
consistent with its constitutional authority. Even with respect to
constitutional questions, one might argue that members of Congress
take (or should take) a cautious approach to exercising its legislative
powers.188 On this line of reasoning, courts should assume that Congress
“plays it safe” when it legislates, enacting laws that are clearly within
its enumerated powers. In so doing, Congress would avoid accidental
constitutional excess, even if at the expense of legislating less
expansively than it otherwise could.189
Suppose one finds that story persuasive. Is that enough to rescue
the avoidance canon in its modern form? Maybe. As discussed in Part
I, evidence-management doctrines like the one proposed here are
epistemically puzzling. Ordinarily, evidence that is helpful to an
investigation should be considered as a matter of course. In this case,
assuming uncertain constitutionality is evidence of statutory meaning,
the question is why not consider it in every case, weighing it against
other evidence like statutory structure or apparent purpose?
Understood as an evidence-management doctrine, what the canon of
constitutional avoidance instructs courts to do is to determine whether
a statute has a “clear” meaning based upon evidence other than
uncertain constitutionality (or, in the case of classic avoidance, actual
unconstitutionality). Only if the answer is “no” should courts go on to
consider whether one of the seemingly available readings would raise
“substantial constitutional questions” (or, alternatively, be
constitutionally invalid). Again, the question is what would justify that
conditional structure?

concerns. So interpreted, Justice Scalia’s characterization would be analogous to the
doctrinal justification for Chevron, which is that Congress intends that courts resolve
statutory unclarity in administrative cases by deferring to administering agencies. See
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)
(explaining agency deference by appeal to implicit congressional delegation).
187 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
188 See Fallon, supra note 151 (arguing that attribution of attitudes to Congress as such
is an unavoidably normative task).
189 Another “advantage” of conceiving of the avoidance canon as an evidencemanagement doctrine is that it would provide a principled justification for the current
judicial practice of applying that canon when determining whether a statutory text
counts as “clear” for Chevron purposes. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); see also infra notes
246-267 and accompanying text.
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One possibility is cost. If figuring out whether some reading
would raise “substantial constitutional questions” were especially costly,
courts would potentially be justified in asking that question only after
attending to other, less expensive evidence of statutory meaning. Is that
plausible, though?
Conceivably, actually answering “substantial
constitutional questions” takes serious work. For that reason, costefficiency might provide an alternate justification for the avoidance
canon in its classical form.190 But merely identifying “substantial”
questions?
Another, more promising possibility is psychological bias. If
uncertain constitutionality is probative of statutory meaning, but, for
reasons of psychological bias, judges are disposed to overweight it, it
could make sense for judges to consider whether a reading would raise
“substantial constitutional questions” only if other, less biasing evidence
is insufficient to rule it out. And that really does seem plausible. Given
the alleged “gravity” of judicial review, it is all too realistic that judges
would overweight uncertain constitutionality in an unconscious effort to
avoid having to even contemplate declaring an act of Congress invalid.191
As a check against that bias, courts might be justified, then, in asking
whether some reading is “clearly” correct wholly apart from any
constitutional questions it might raise, considering apparent
constitutionality only if the answer is “no.”
Notice, however, that even if reconceiving the avoidance canon as
an evidence-management doctrine helps make sense of the doctrine
being triggered by mere constitutional “questions” or “doubts,” it does so
at the cost of reducing substantially the legal significance of
constitutional questionability or doubtfulness. By analogy, the plain
meaning rule conditions consideration of legislative history upon textual
unclarity, but says nothing about the weight of legislative history in
relation to other sources—a court might, for example, determine that
legislative history is moderately supportive of reading A, but decide that
the totality of evidence supports reading B. The canon of constitutional
avoidance, by contrast, traditionally treats apparent constitutionality as
a trumping consideration if courts consider it at all. Treating apparent
constitutionality as a trump makes sense if erring in that direction
constitutes “playing it safe” under conditions of uncertainty. If,
Though remember the tradeoffs in terms of willfulness and motivated reasoning
that would be involved. See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
191 Or, for that matter, to avoid having to do the hard work involved in answering
“substantial constitutional questions.”
190
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however, apparent constitutionality is merely evidence of statutory
meaning, it would likely be outweighed in various cases by various other
familiar sources such as text, structure, and apparent purpose. Put
differently, reconceiving the avoidance canon as an evidencemanagement doctrine might get one from classic to modern avoidance,
but it would probably do so at the expense of rendering the canon
dramatically less consequential.

B. Lenity
The rule of lenity famously instructs courts to resolve any
unclarity in a criminal statute in favor of the defendant. 192 Like
Chevron, the rule of lenity seems hard to understand as an evidencemanagement doctrine. Recent attitudinal shifts notwithstanding, the
political climate in the United States has, at least since the 1980s,
supported an unusually harsh approach to criminal sentencing,193 as
well as an expansive attitude toward criminalization.194 Given this
reality, that a reading of a contemporary criminal statute is relatively
harsh probably makes it more likely, not less, to be the one that
Congress intended.195
So what about uncertainty management? Characterizing lenity
as an uncertainty-management doctrine fits neatly with the rule’s
stated justifications. Other than historical pedigree,196 courts invoking
the rule of lenity tend to cite two considerations in support. The first is
See, e.g., United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994) (“In these
circumstances—where text, structure, and history fail to establish that the
Government’s position is unambiguously correct—we apply the rule of lenity and
resolve the ambiguity in [the defendant’s] favor.”).
193 Unusual in relation to the global statistical norms. See Yes, U.S. Locks People Up
at a Higher Rate than Any Other Country, WASH. POST (July 7, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/07/yes-u-s-lockspeople-up-at-a-higher-rate-than-any-other-country/.
194 See DOUGLAS HUSAK OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 3
(2008) (describing the “explosive growth in the size and scope of the criminal law”).
195 This is true even for those concerned with “objectified” intent, see supra note 79 and
accompanying text, insofar as one infers just from the harshness and scope of
contemporary criminal statutes a disposition towards the punitive rather than the
lenient.
196 See United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 310 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (recognizing the “the ancient requirement that
criminal statutes speak plainly and unmistakably” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
192
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that it is the role of “legislatures, not courts, [to] define criminal
liability.”197 The second is that criminal defendants are entitled to
“adequate notice of the conduct that the law prohibits.”198
On defining criminal liability, the thought here seems to be that
the criminal law is, in some places, either underdetermined or
unknowable.199 For that reason, holding a defendant liable in one of
those places would, either de jure or de facto, amount to law declaration
rather than law identification.
The connection with managing
uncertainty is straightforward, given that way of thinking. Assuming
there is an illegitimacy cost to convicting a defendant for conduct not
knowably prohibited at the time, it would be safer for a court to allow
conviction only if it actually knows that the conduct was prohibited.
The same story applies to adequate notice. There, the illegitimacy
of convicting a defendant for conduct not knowably prohibited at the
time has less to do with separation of powers than with due process and
basic fairness. Here again, though, the easiest way to avoid that sort of
illegitimate conviction is to permit conviction for conduct a court knows
is prohibited. Which is to say, conduct “clearly” proscribed by the
statute.200
Even if the rule of lenity is justified in some form, though, maybe
the more interesting question is how demanding a “clarity” threshold
the rule can sustain. As mentioned above, the doctrine as presently
construed applies only if a court “can make no more than a guess” as to
statutory meaning.201 In a criminal case, in other words, a statute is
“clear” at something much closer to 55-45 than to 90-10—and, as a
result, “recent judicial applications of the rule appear to be rare.”202
What this easy-to-satisfy threshold suggests, then, is that, even if erring
in a defendant’s favor constitutes “playing it safe” in a criminal case,
very little caution is required because the stakes in such cases are low.
That might seem surprising. As suggested by, for example, the
increased burden of proof for criminal conviction or the relative severity
Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990).
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 397 (2005).
199 See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
200 Someone with consequentialist leanings might object that any illegitimacy costs
associated with conviction for not-knowably-prohibited conduct is offset by the welfare
gains of punishing socially harmful behavior. See Daniel Epps, The Consequences of
Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1089-92 (2015) (describing such
objections).
201 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
202 Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2427 (2006).
197
198
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of criminal sanctions, a seeming premise of our legal system is that
criminal conviction is a really big deal.203 If that’s right, though, what
accounts for the relative ease with which courts declare criminal
statutes “clear,” thereby triggering severe criminal sanctions, and so on?
To understand how little work lenity does, consider two cases, one
an old chestnut204 and another more recent. First, in the familiar Smith
v. United States,205 the defendant had traded a fully automatic MAC-10
assault rifle to an undercover officer for two ounces of cocaine.206 Among
other offenses, the defendant was subsequently charged with and
convicted of “using” a firearm “during and in relation to ... [a] drug
trafficking crime.”207 On appeal, the defendant argued that use for
purposes of exchange did not constitute “us[e]” of a firearm in the
relevant sense.208 6-3, the Supreme Court held that it did. Writing for
the majority, Justice O’Connor observed that various dictionaries as
well as previous caselaw defined “to use” broadly to include “to employ”
and “to derive service from.”209 Reasoning that the defendant had
plainly “employed” and “derived service from” his firearm, the statute,
she concluded, plainly applied to his conduct.210 In dissent, Justice
Scalia marshalled various ordinary language examples in support of the
proposition that “[t]o [‘]use[‘] an instrumentality ordinarily means to use
it for its intended purpose.”211 Moving from the general to the specific,
Justice Scalia inferred that, as used in the statute, “us[e]” of a firearm
was most naturally read as use as a weapon.212 Bolstering his legal
conclusion that the defendant in the case ought to prevail, Justice Scalia
added that, “[e]ven if the reader does not consider the issue to be as clear
as I do, he must at least acknowledge, I think, that it is eminently

See Doerfler, supra note 60, at 550.
Or maybe better, middle-aged.
205 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
206 Id. at 225-26.
207 Id. at 226-27 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(23)
(imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment if the “firearm”
used is a “machinegun”); 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (defining “machinegun” to include
automatic weapons).
208 Smith, 508 U.S. at 228.
209 Id. at 228-29 (quoting Astor v. Merritt, 111 U.S. 202, 213 (1884)).
210 Id. at 229. Justice O’Connor also emphasized that there was no indication that
Congress intended to deviate from the “ordinary” meaning of the term at issue. Id. at
228.
211 Id. at 242 (“When someone asks, “Do you use a cane?,” he is not inquiring whether
you have your grandfather’s silver-handled walking stick on display in the hall; he
wants to know whether you walk with a cane.”).
212 Id. at 242-44.
203
204
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debatable—and that is enough, under the rule of lenity, to require
finding for the [defendant] here.”213
Second, in the more recent Lockhart v. United States,214 the
defendant had been convicted of possession of child pornography.215
Based upon a previous conviction for sexual abuse of his then-53-yearold girlfriend, the defendant was subsequently deemed subject to a 10year mandatory minimum sentence applicable to offenders with “a prior
conviction ... under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual
abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or
ward.”216 On appeal, the defendant argued that his prior conviction was
not for “sexual abuse … involving a minor or ward,” and so the
mandatory minimum did not apply.217 Again, the Supreme Court
disagreed, this time 6-2. Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor
explained that the qualifier “involving a minor or ward” attached only
to the last item on the list of offenses, namely “abusive sexual conduct,”
meaning that the defendants prior conviction for “sexual abuse” of an
adult was sufficient to trigger the mandatory minimum.218 In defense
of that reading, Justice Sotomayor offered ordinary language
analogies,219 as well as an appeal to something called the “rule of the
last antecedent.”220 Justice Sotomayor also drew support from “nearly
identical[ly]” worded statutes in which it was clear that “sexual abuse”
meant sexual abuse of any kind.221 In dissent, Justice Kagan argued
that the qualifier “involving a minor or ward” took scope over the entire
list of triggering offenses.222 In support of her reading, Justice Kagan,
too, offered colorful (and topical) analogies, observing, for example, that
“a real estate agent [who] promised to find a client ‘a house, condo, or
apartment in New York’” would not have fulfilled with her promise by

Id. at 246.
136 S. Ct. 958 (2016).
215 Id. at 961.
216 Id. at 961-62 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2)).
217 Id. at 962.
218 Id. at 961.
219 Id. at 963 (“For example, imagine you are the general manager of the Yankees and
you are rounding out your 2016 roster. You tell your scouts to find a defensive catcher,
a quick-footed shortstop, or a pitcher from last year’s World Champion Kansas City
Royals. It would be natural for your scouts to confine their search for a pitcher to last
year’s championship team, but to look more broadly for catchers and shortstops.”).
220 Id. at 962-63 (quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003)).
221 Id. at 964 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-43).
222 Id. at 969.
213
214

45

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3326550

sending “information about condos in Maryland or California.”223 Like
Justice Sotomayor, she also attempted to support her position with a
purported principle of positive law—this time, the “series-qualifier
canon.”224 And finally, like Justice Scalia in Smith, Justice Kagan
appealed to lenity, reasoning that even if the case were “less clear” than
her opinion suggested, surely the statute was at least ambiguous and so
the defendant ought to prevail.225
Again, one reading of cases like Smith and Lockhart is that judges
regard criminal cases as having remarkably low stakes. In each case,
even if one is disposed to agree with the majority’s reading, it is hard to
suggest that the majority’s arguments are dramatically more forceful
than those of the dissent. But if that’s right, it is correspondingly
difficult to imagine that the majority in either case was substantially
more confident—let alone reasonably more confident—in their reading
than 55-45. And, again, if 55-45 is enough to count as “clear” for
purposes of lenity, convicting someone of a criminal offense is being
treated by courts as akin to giving up on an uninteresting seminar.
Another, more charitable explanation of what is going on in those
cases, though, is that, although accepting that the stakes of criminal
cases are high, courts regard the costs of mistake as closer to symmetric
than our legal tradition might suggest.226 “[B]etter that ten guilty
persons escape, than that one innocent suffer” is, as Dan Epps puts it,
“perhaps the most revered adage in the criminal law.”227 Owed to the
relative severity of criminal sanctions, criminal adjudication is biased
against false convictions in various ways that, for example, civil
adjudication is not similarly biased against false judgments of liability.
Implicit in this bias, of course, is that the cost of false acquittals is
comparatively low. As scholars going back to Bentham have argued,
however, the cost of false acquittals to crime victims is also significant,

Id. (“Imagine a friend told you that she hoped to meet ‘an actor, director, or producer
involved with the new Star Wars movie.’ You would know immediately that she
wanted to meet an actor from the Star Wars cast—not an actor in, for example, the
latest Zoolander.”).
224 Id. at 970 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1574 (2014)).
225 Id. at 977.
226 A less charitable explanation is that courts fail to take seriously the severity of
criminal sanctions. See Raab, supra note 103, at 188 (highlighting the “infringements
on liberty that have resulted in the discriminatory mass incarceration,
overcriminalization, and overpunishment that characterize the American criminal
justice system today”).
227 Epps, supra note 200, at 1067.
223
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even if not quite as significant as the cost of false convictions to
convicts.228
Taking that seriously, what contemporary courts might be
thinking is that criminal adjudication is similar to decision-making
scenarios in which it is appropriate to act on one’s “best guess” under
conditions of uncertainty. To illustrate, suppose that a bomb is about to
explode, and that a technician can cut one of two wires, red or green.
Cutting the correct wire will diffuse the bomb; cutting the incorrect wire
will cause the bomb to explode. Suppose now that a technician is
moderately confident—say, 65-35—that cutting the red wire will diffuse
the bomb. In that situation, it would, given the stakes, be unreasonable
for the technician to think it “clear” that cutting the red wire will diffuse
the bomb. Be that as it may, she should obviously cut the red wire.
Given the symmetry of the costs of mistake, the rational thing for the
technician to do is to act on her inclination, however modest.
Turning back to criminal adjudication, assume ala Bentham that
the cost of false acquittals is high, but that the cost of false convictions
is slightly higher—as seems entirely plausible in cases involving cocaine
and machineguns or serial sex offenders. On that assumption, how
should a court behave if it is moderately confident—again, 65-35—that
a defendant’s conduct is covered by a criminal statute? As in the bomb
scenario, it would be unreasonable, given the stakes, for the court to say
that it is “clear” that the defendant acted unlawfully. At the same time,
considering the near symmetry of the costs of mistake, it is plausible
that courts should nonetheless enforce the more likely reading of the
statute, acting, in other words, on its “best guess.”229 As bad as wrongful
conviction might be, failing to enforce the criminal law is not to be taken
lightly, in particular when the potential offenses are so serious.
The above story also fits with how courts talk about lenity today.
While the rule of lenity is classically phrased as a rule for “resolv[ing]
ambiguity,” present doctrine is that the “simple existence of some
statutory ambiguity” is not enough to “warrant [the rule’s] application,”
and that instead a court should afford lenity only if it has “no more than
a guess” as to statutory meaning. What this suggests is that, as
presently understood, the rule of lenity does not actually require “clear”
statutory meaning, however much clarity that would require. To the
See id. at 1089-92.
In terms of expected utility, what to do would depend upon how slight the cost
asymmetry turns out to be.
228
229
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contrary, so long as a court has more than a literal “guess” as to what
Congress intended, a court should enforce the reading of the statute it
thinks is most likely correct. That there are other plausible readings is
neither here nor there.230

C. Legislative History
Under current doctrine, courts should consult legislative history
only if the corresponding statutory text is less than “clear.”231 This
doctrine is most naturally and most commonly understood as managing
evidence of statutory meaning.232 For those who do so at all, considering
legislative history helps to “illuminat[e] … what Congress meant,” 233
“shed[ding] light” on the correct reading of the statutory language at
issue.234
Objections to considering legislative history at all are, at this
point, familiar. Justice Scalia and others famously characterized
reliance upon legislative history as effectively permitting members of
Congress (as well as lobbyists and staffers) to circumvent Article I,
§ 7.235 In addition, he worried that attending to legislative history left

The story here is also consistent with continued adherence to the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard of proof in criminal cases. Insofar as it applies to factual,
as opposed to legal, determinations, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard might
serve merely to offset structural advantages at trial enjoyed by the prosecution. Cf.
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1979) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The Bill of
Rights does not envision an adversary proceeding between two equal parties.”).
231 E.g., N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 942 (2017) (“The text is clear, so we
need not consider this extra-textual evidence.”); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (“Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory
interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s
understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.”); Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S.
209, 215 (2005) (“Because the meaning of [the provision’s] text is plain and
unambiguous, we need not accept petitioners’ invitation to consider the legislative
history.”); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) (“[W]e do not resort to
legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.”).
232 For a contrary view, see EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO
INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 115-16 (2008) (arguing that resolving statutory
unclarity by appeal to legislative history may appropriate if doing so helps “to
determine which interpretation will maximize expected political satisfaction”).
233 U.S. Dep’t of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599 (1982).
234 Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 124 (1985) (“The legislative history of [the statute]
sheds light on its meaning.”).
235 See, e.g., Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1176-77 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring
in principal part and concurring in the judgment); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511,
230
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judges with nearly unbounded discretion.236 More modestly, Adrian
Vermeule has argued that we have no reason to believe that judges are
any good at evaluating legislative history, which leaves courts without
justification for the tremendous cost that researching legislative history
involves.237
On the other side of this jurisprudential dispute, those who
believe that attending to legislative history is useful occasionally insist
that courts should do so as a matter of course. Justice Stevens, for
example, reasoned that, although “[in] recent years the Court has
suggested that we should only look at legislative history for the purpose
of resolving textual ambiguities,” it would be “wiser to acknowledge that
it is always appropriate to consider all available evidence of Congress’
true intent when interpreting its work product.”238
As discussed above, Justice Stevens’s reasoning has initial
plausibility.239 Assuming arguendo that legislative history is probative
of statutory meaning, courts would improve their interpretive accuracy
by considering it in any given case.240 Sometimes, though, interpretive
accuracy isn’t everything. Even if one is more optimistic than Professor
Vermeule concerning courts’ ability to evaluate legislative history, it
seems hard to deny that conducting legislative-history research is, as he
puts it, “costly and time-consuming.”241 As Judge Leventhal cautioned,
“[j]udicial investigation of legislative history has a tendency to become
… an exercise in “‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.’”242
To protect against that tendency, responsible legislative-history
research requires independent and comprehensive assessment of a
sometimes “massively voluminous” set of materials.243 Even assuming,
then, that judges come out at the end of that process with more accurate
beliefs about statutory meaning, very often cost involved will not be
519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S.
87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
236 See Scalia, supra note 79, at 35-36.
237 VERMEULE, supra note 63, at 107-15, 192.
238 543 U.S. 50, 65 (2004).
239 See supra Part I.A.
240 Assuming, that is, that courts are not unduly biased in favor of legislative history
in comparison with other sources of statutory meaning. Because legislative history is
most often characterized by its critics as a sort of Rorschach test, it is not entirely clear
what being biased in its favor even comes to.
241 VERMEULE, supra note 63, at 193.
242 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (quoting
Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983)).
243 VERMEULE, supra note 63, at 193
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justified by the resulting accuracy gain. Again, sometimes “cheap and
good enough” really is good enough.
So when (if at all) should courts consider legislative history? The
short answer is: whenever it is worth it. Again, when judging whether
a statutory text is “clear” for purposes of some “clarity” doctrine, a court
is determining whether that text is clear enough for the relevant
purposes.244 For the purpose of managing cost, a court might thus deem
a statutory text “clear” in a relatively unimportant case based upon
moderate epistemic confidence or justification.245 With so little at stake,
why take on the additional burden of wading through a “massively
voluminous” set of materials to improve interpretive accuracy only
somewhat? By contrast, in a more significant case, a court might declare
a text less than “clear” even assuming analogous epistemic justification
or confidence. In that situation, a sufficient amount would be on the line
to justify consulting additional, more expensive sources of statutory
meaning.
Assuming, then, that legislative history is probative of statutory
meaning, the doctrinal status quo seems defensible, at least in relation
to other, cheaper sources of statutory meaning.246 More concerning is
the status quo as it pertains to the relationship between legislative
history and other “clarity” doctrines.247 In United States v. R.L.C.,248 for
instance, the question before the Court was how to interpret a statute
limiting juvenile detention to the “maximum term of imprisonment that
would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an
adult.”249 In that case, the defendant had been convicted of committing
an act of juvenile delinquency.250 The district court imposed a sentence
of three-years’ detention, reasoning that three-years’ imprisonment was
the maximum sentence for the analogous offence under the
corresponding statute.251 The Court of Appeals reduced the defendant’s
sentence to 18 months, explaining that 18-months’ imprisonment was
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
See Schauer, supra note 95.
246 Indeed, current doctrine seems agnostic as to the probative value of legislative
history insofar as consideration of legislative history is permitted but not required if
statutory text is less than “clear.” See Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 574 (2011).
247 See Gluck, supra note 22, at 2063 (“It remains unanswered whether a policy canon
is still relevant if legislative history alone would clarify statutory language.”).
248 503 U.S. 291 (1992).
249 Id. at 294 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(1)(B)).
250 Id. at 295 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 5031).
251 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (imposing a maximum sentence of 3-years’
imprisonment for involuntary manslaughter).
244
245
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the maximum sentence a court could have imposed on a similarly
situated adult after applying the Sentencing Guidelines.252 Writing for
a plurality, Justice Souter started with the statutory text, determining
that the Government’s harsher interpretation was, at best, “one possible
resolution of statutory ambiguity.”253 Justice Souter then went on to
consider the Act’s legislative history, concluding ultimately that the
accompanying Senate Report and “other elements” resolved any
ambiguity in the defendant’s favor.254
Concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas
and Kennedy, insisted that once the Court had concluded that the
statutory text was at most “ambiguous,” that should have been the end
of the case.255 The reason, according to Justice Scalia, was that it was
“not consistent with the rule of lenity to construe a textually ambiguous
penal statute against a criminal defendant on the basis of legislative
history.”256
The rule of lenity is, again, most plausibly characterized as an
uncertainty-management doctrine—as an empirical matter, there is
little reason to think that members of Congress prefer narrower, as
opposed to broader, definitions of federal crimes, nor is there any
indication that federal judges would be unduly biased in favor of that
consideration if it were true.257 Given that characterization, it is hard
to see why there should be any uncertainty whether courts should
consider legislative history within the lenity framework. What the rule
of lenity does, after all, is help courts “play it safe” in criminal cases
under conditions of uncertainty. But if considering legislative history
could help courts become certain of statutory meaning, why not do so in
the course of determining whether there is a need to “play it safe”?258

R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 295-96; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2A1.4(a)(2) (1991).
253 R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 298.
254 Id. at 303-05.
255 Id. at 307-08.
256 Id. at 307; see also United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 429 (2009) (debating
whether legislative history could be considered to make “clear” a statute before the
rule of lenity would be applied).
257 Again, one can reason similarly about Congress’s “objectified” intent. See supra
note 195 and accompanying text.
258 Alternatively, considering legislative history could make a court uncertain about
statutory meaning, in which case it would have discovered that it has reason to “play
it safe.” Either way, what is relevant is that, by considering legislative history, a court
will have improved its epistemic position, thereby making it assessment concerning
the need to allocate risk better informed.
252
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The inference above is, of course, a general one, applying to
uncertainty-management doctrines across the board.259 Consider, for
example, Dellmuth v. Muth,260 in which the Court held:
Legislative history generally will be irrelevant to a judicial
inquiry into whether Congress intended to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment.
If Congress’ intention is
“unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,”
recourse to legislative history will be unnecessary; if
Congress’ intention is not unmistakably clear, recourse to
legislative history will be futile, because by definition [the
presumption against abrogation is not overcome].261
The “clear statement” rule concerning state sovereign immunity is
almost certainly about managing uncertainty, as opposed to managing
evidence.262 As the Court explained in Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon,263 judicial “reluctance to infer that a State’s immunity from suit
in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the vital
role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal system.”264
Owed to the “special and specific position in our constitutional system,”
the Court continued, it is thus “incumbent upon the federal courts to be
certain of Congress’ intent before finding that federal law overrides the
guarantees of the Eleventh Amendment.”265
Taking Atascadero at its word, then, construing a federal statute
as not abrogating state sovereign immunity constitutes “playing it safe”
under conditions of uncertainty for the reason that unsettling the “usual
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government”
is a really big deal.266 Whatever one thinks of that assessment, it is,
again, hard to see why courts ought not to consider legislative history
when determining whether Congress has spoken with “unmistakabl[e]
Again, courts do consider legislative history within the Chevron framework. See
supra note 53 and accompanying text.
260 491 U.S. 223 (1989).
261 Id. at 230 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
262 See Eskridge, supra note 27, at 613 (characterizing the application of pro-federalism
canons by courts as “activist”). The same is likely true of, for example, the other profederalism canons. Seem e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991)
(recognizing a “clear” statement rule concerning federal regulation of fundamental
aspects of state sovereignty); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 241 (1947)
(recognizing a presumption against federal preemption of state law).
263 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
264 Id. at 242.
265 Id. at 243.
266 Id. at 242-43.
259
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cl[arity].” Even conceding that statutory text is the “best evidence” of
what Congress intends,267 it is, by no means, the only evidence. And
what that means is that, at least in some cases, turning from statutory
text to legislative history will eliminate (or create) doubt—again,
assuming that considering legislative history is helpful in general.

D. Chevron/Skidmore
Chevron holds that a reviewing court should enforce an agency’s
reading of a statute that the agency administers so long as the agency’s
reading is not “clear[ly]” inconsistent with the statutory text.268 As the
Court in that case explained, resolving statutory unclarity very often
amounts to a “policy choice[],” and within our constitutional system, the
“‘responsibilit[y]’” for such choices resides with “‘the political
branches.’”269 In view of that explanation, Chevron is understood most
naturally as an uncertainty-management doctrine. An agency’s views
within the Chevron framework are, as discussed above, not treated as
evidence of statutory meaning.270 To the contrary, a reviewing court
defers to an agency only if statutory meaning has run out, or, at the very
least, is uncertain. Resolving statutory unclarity is, consistent with this
story, characterized as “fill[ing]” a “gap” in the law left by Congress.271
The absence of identifiable law is what makes it appropriate to defer to
a more technically competent and more politically accountable
agency.272
In terms of uncertainty management, the thought here seems to
be that, at a certain point, ‘interpreting’ an unclear statute amounts to
policymaking insofar as the content of the law is underdetermined or,
alternatively, unknowable.273 Reversing an agency action in such
West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) (“The best
evidence of [Congress’] purpose is the statutory text adopted by both Houses of
Congress and submitted to the President”); but see Baude & Doerfler, supra note 11,
at 562 (observing that the relative probative value of textual and non-textual evidence
is “difficult to assess on a categorical basis”)
268 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
269 Id. at 866 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
270 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
271 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
272 Id. at 865-66.
273 In the latter situation, even though there is law that settles the dispute in question,
courts lack epistemic access to it and so must decide the case on non-legal grounds.
See Hrafn Asgeirsson, Can Legal Practice Adjudicate between Theories of Vagueness?,
267

53

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3326550

circumstances would thus amount to “substitut[ing]” a court’s policy
choice for those of an agency—an agency tasked with making those sorts
of choices.274 On that story, courts thereby “play it safe” by reversing an
agency action only if they know there is law that precludes it. “[E]ven if
the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is the best
statutory interpretation,” the reasoning goes, best not to risk
encroaching upon that agency’s assigned policymaking authority.275
Whether that reasoning makes sense may turn upon the correct
understanding of the role of the judiciary. “It is,” as we are reminded so
often, “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.”276 And, as Justice Thomas observes, “[t]hose who
ratified the Constitution knew that legal texts would often contain
ambiguities,” which is why “[t]he judicial power was understood to
include the power to resolve these ambiguities over time.”277 Heard one
way, Justice Thomas’s observation suggests that courts needn’t be so
hesitant to fill statutory “gaps”—sometimes the law is unsettled, and it
is the job of courts, and not agencies, to settle it. Heard another way, of
course, all that Justice Thomas’s observation entails is that courts
should try to identify and declare statutory meaning, even if doing so is
hard. Legal texts are, uncontroversially, not always easy to make sense
of. Sometimes, though, courts can attend carefully to an “ambiguous”
statute and figure out what it means.278 In those situations, ambiguity
is indeed “resolved,” but resolved through discovery, as opposed to
stipulation—that is, as opposed to policymaking. If, then, the judicial
power includes merely the “power” to say what the law is even if the law
is hard to discern, that says very little about what courts should do if
the law cannot be discerned, or at least not discerned with adequate
confidence.279

in VAGUENESS AND THE LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 95 (Geert Keil
& Ralf Poscher eds., 2016) (discussing epistemic and non-epistemic theories of legal
indeterminacy).
274 Id. at 843-44, 865-66.
275 Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
980 (2005).
276 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
277 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (2015).
278 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
279 Insofar as the role of the judiciary is to “say what the law is,” perhaps worth
mentioning is that, on the standard account of assertion, it is appropriate to say that
p (e.g., “The law is precludes the agency’s action.”) only if one knows that p (e.g., only
if one knows that the law precludes the agency’s action). See TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON,
KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS 243 (2000).
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Rather than adjudicate that familiar dispute,280 though, it is
maybe more interesting to consider Chevron’s doctrinal complement,
Skidmore.281 Like Chevron, Skidmore puts a thumb on the scale in favor
of agency readings. Unlike Chevron, however, Skidmore appears to
treat an agency’s views as evidence of statutory meaning. To elaborate,
Skidmore holds that an agency’s reading of some statute that agency
handles is entitled to “respect proportional to its ‘power to persuade.’”282
The opinion articulates numerous factors that help to determine the
amount of “respect” a particular reading is owed, including “the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,”
and, of special interest here, “its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements.”283 Most tellingly, Skidmore instructs courts to assign
(potentially “considerable”) “weight” to an agency’s reading, weighing it
along with other evidence of statutory meaning in an effort to determine
the statute’s “better”284 or “correct”285 interpretation.286
It makes sense that agencies might have insight into what a
statute means. Statutes often deal with technical subject matter, and
For recent, helpful treatments of these and other objections to Chevron, see
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L. REV.
937 (2018) (considering both constitutional objections); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as
Law (manuscript) (considering both constitutional and statutory objections, defending
Chevron on stare decisis grounds).
281 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136 (1944).
282 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S.
at 140)).
283 Here Skidmore contrasts importantly with Chevron.
See Nat’l Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)
(holding that “agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s
interpretation under the Chevron framework”); Smiley v. Citibank (S. Dakota), N.A.,
517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (“[C]hange is not invalidating, since the whole point of
Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the
implementing agency.”).
284 Town of Stratford, Conn. v. FAA., 292 F.3d 251, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (reasoning that
if Chevron is inapplicable, then the “better” interpretation prevails).
285 Campesinos Unidos, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 803 F.2d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 1986)
(“Although not binding on this court, the Secretary’s interpretation of his own
regulation is entitled to some deference, and here we believe that interpretation to be
correct.” (emphasis added)).
286 See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1256 (2007) (acknowledging that “most of the
Court’s post-Mead applications of Skidmore review reflect the independent judgment
model”); Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency Commitment, and Force of
Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1015 (2005) (“[Mead] basically instructs courts to exercise
independent judgment regarding statutory meaning subject to the weak requirement
that they carefully consider agency views for persuasiveness [if Chevron does not
apply].”).
280
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technical expertise can be an important interpretive resource when
making sense of technical statutes.287 Agencies are also sometimes
involved with the drafting of statutes, providing intimate knowledge of
how those statutes were understood at the time of enactment.288 Last
and most obvious, agencies deal with statutes on a day-to-day basis in
all sorts of settings, providing awareness of both statutory details and
overall structure.289
In terms of structure, Skidmore is, importantly, not a “clarity”
doctrine. Instead of telling courts to consider an agency’s views only if
other sources leave statutory meaning uncertain, courts attend to such
views in the course of the general interpretive inquiry. That seems
sensible insofar as it is hard to see what special consideration(s) would
call for lexical ordering in this instance. Taking account of an agency’s
views is hardly cost-prohibitive. Nor does it seem that courts would be
unduly biased in an agency’s favor, at least controlling for partisan
leanings.
More difficult to understand is why courts treat Skidmore and
Chevron as alternatives. Generally speaking, courts reason that
Skidmore “respect” is owed in cases that fall outside of Chevron’s
“domain.”290 That seems odd insofar as Skidmore and Chevron appear
logically unrelated. Again, under Skidmore, an agency’s views are
evidence of statutory meaning. Under Chevron, by contrast, those views
constitute a legal basis for deciding a case if statutory meaning is
unknown. Assuming those two characterizations are correct, it seems
unmotivated to consider an agency’s views as evidence of statutory
Hickman & Krueger, supra note 286, at 1249 (“[A]s the Skidmore Court
acknowledged, courts often lack the resources and expertise to understand and
evaluate fully the consequences of complex statutory schemes.”).
288 See Jarrod Shobe, Agencies As Legislators: An Empirical Study of the Role of
Agencies in the Legislative Process, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 455 (2017) (describing
“various ways … agencies are involved in legislative drafting”); see also Norwegian
Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933) (explaining that an
agency interpretation adopted contemporaneously with the statute’s passage has
“peculiar weight”).
289 Such awareness could serve as a helpful check against what Victoria Nourse terms
“isolationist” interpretation. See Victoria Nourse, Picking and Choosing Text: Lessons
for Statutory Interpretation from the Philosophy of Language, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1409
(2017)) (identifying and criticizing the practice “pull[ing] a term out of a statute and
isolat[ing] it from the rest of the text”).
290 See Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1441 (2017) (characterizing Mead as having “limited the scope of
Chevron’s applicability to agency actions carrying the force of law and reinstated the
multifactor Skidmore standard as an alternative for those that do not”).
287
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meaning only in those situations in which an agency lacks the authority
to make binding policy choices.291 To the contrary, insofar as the
question for cases within Chevron’s domain is whether Congress has
spoken “clearly,” it seems that, in the course of that inquiry, courts
should afford an agency interpretation the “respect” such
interpretations are owed.
Notice further that, insofar as courts were to afford Skidmore
“respect” when determining whether a statutory text is “clear” for
purposes of Chevron, the dispute between Justice Gorsuch and Justice
Alito concerning how clear a text has to be to count as “clear” under
Chevron would become less consequential. Even if, after all, courts were
to gravitate towards Justice Gorsuch’s position, treating 55-45 as the
threshold for “clear,” insofar as courts were simultaneously to start
treating the agency’s interpretation as evidence of statutory meaning,
the overall framework would remain substantially deferential.292
To be sure, courts might also decide that affording “respect” to
informal agency interpretations is better justified by appeal to
pragmatic considerations like technical expertise and democratic
accountability—that is, courts might reconceive Skidmore as an
uncertainty-management doctrine.293 In that event, courts would
presumably do best to reject consistency as an indicator of
respectworthiness, just as they have with Chevron.294 More still, courts
would need to transform Skidmore into a “clarity” doctrine, the reason
being that, as with Chevron, an agency’s views would no longer be
regarded as relevant to the question of statutory meaning.295 In other
words, reconceived as an uncertainty-management doctrine, an agency’s
informal views would only come in under Skidmore once statutory
meaning had run out.

See Mead, 533 U.S. at 219 (explaining that a “very good indicator of delegation
meriting Chevron treatment is express congressional authorizations to engage in the
rulemaking or adjudication process”).
292 Of course, if courts were to begin affording Skidmore “respect” when determining
“clarity while also adhering to a relatively demanding clarity threshold, the overall
framework would be even more favorable to agencies than it currently is.
293 Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1453 (2011) (observing an analogous “transformation” in the
rationale for deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations).
294 See supra note __ and accompanying text.
295 On this approach, the degree of clarity required would, presumably, be inversely
proportional to the degree of “respect” qua policy determination the agency’s informal
views were owed.
291
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CONCLUSION
Doctrines like Chevron or the plain meaning rule can be
frustrating. Sometimes courts declare statutory text “clear” (or not), and
it seems grounded in little more than partisanship. In such moments,
it is tempting to say that “clarity” standards are the problem—too easily
manipulated by willful or motivated judges. The question, though, is,
what is the alternative? Why think that other standards would be any
less easy to manipulate? And assuming we adopted “clarity” doctrines
for a reason, what would we be giving up by abandoning them?
“clarity” doctrines do require additional, more systematic
scrutiny. As this Article argues, though, such doctrines need to be
scrutinized individually, not all in one go. Chevron and the plain
meaning rule do very different things and serve very different purposes.
At the end of the day, it may be that courts do best to abandon one or
both of those doctrines. But if that’s true, it is for reasons having to do
with those specific doctrines, and not with the abstract idea of “clear”
text. More still, those individual doctrines can be assessed in a perfectly
rational and organized fashion. As this Article shows, once one
understands what different “clarity” doctrines do, it becomes much more
straightforward to assess whether they do it well.
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